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This dissertation is comprised of three essays which focus on hedge fund performance 
and derivative hedging. The first essay uses ETF returns as proxies for tradable risk factors in 
hedge fund performance evaluation and identifies contemporaneously relevant risk factors from 
the entire universe of ETFs. The model provides more informative estimates of alpha and beta 
coefficients for predicting hedge fund out-of-sample performance compared with other widely 
used hedge fund factor models. Portfolios of top alpha hedge funds selected by the model 
generate statistically significant out-of-sample performance that is substantially higher compared 
with portfolios selected by other models. In addition, the beta-weighted clone portfolios exhibit 
substantially higher out-of-sample correlations with underlying hedge funds than clone portfolios 
formed using alternative models. 
The second essay shows that only hedge funds whose returns are driven by beta 
management of exposures to latent risk factors could be successfully replicated. I develop a 
methodology for creating a portfolio of ETFs that replicates risk factor exposures taken by 
successful beta active cloneable hedge funds. The methodology allows any investor to access 
active factor strategies employed by hedge funds. It could be interpreted as cloning beta 
exposures of the best beta active hedge funds, delivering outstanding long-term risk-adjusted 
performance. The active factor ETF portfolio only requires annual rebalancing, and is 
constructed with a transparent algorithmic approach, which conforms to a definition of a smart 
beta strategy. 
The third essay investigates the use of derivatives among firms. A careful study of 
hedging motives and hedging effectiveness is critical to understanding the financial impact of 
derivative use by firms. I examine the use of commodity derivatives by oil and gas producers and 
 
 
show that, on average, these firms report gains from their derivative positions. The profits from 
derivatives, particularly non-hedge profits, are positively associated with the extent of hedging 
that is classified as market timing activities.  
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
II. Essay 1: Bringing Order to Chaos: Capturing Relevant Information with Hedge Fund Factor 
Models ............................................................................................................................................ 3 
A. Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 3 
B. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 3 
C. Related Literature................................................................................................................. 8 
D. Data .................................................................................................................................... 11 
E. Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 13 
1. The DLM Estimation of Alpha ...................................................................................... 13 
2. Comparison of Performance Evaluation Models ........................................................... 16 
3. Out-of-Sample Testing of Performance Persistence ...................................................... 18 
F. Empirical Results ............................................................................................................... 20 
1. In-Sample Matching and Out-of-Sample Portfolio - DLM Model ................................ 20 
2. In-Sample Matching and Out-of-Sample Portfolio - All Models .................................. 21 
3. Relationship with the Other Models .............................................................................. 23 
4. Longer-Term Persistence of Performance...................................................................... 24 
5. Quality of Out-of-Sample Individual Beta-Weighted Matches ..................................... 24 
G. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 25 
H. References .......................................................................................................................... 27 
III. Essay 2: Active Factor Investing: Hedge Funds vs. the Rest of Us ........................................ 48 
A. Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 48 
B. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 48 
C. Data Description ................................................................................................................ 51 
D. Research Methodology ...................................................................................................... 54 
E. Empirical Results ............................................................................................................... 55 
1. Hedge Funds and Smart Beta ETF Portfolios ................................................................ 55 
2. Beta Active Cloneable Hedge Funds and Smart Beta ETF Portfolios ........................... 56 
3. Smart Beta ETF Portfolio Weights ................................................................................ 57 
F. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 58 
G. References .......................................................................................................................... 59 
 
 
IV. Essay 3: On the Market Timing and Feedback Effect of “Hedging”: Evidence from U.S. Oil 
and Gas Producers......................................................................................................................... 71 
A. Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 71 
B. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 71 
C. Data and Sample Description............................................................................................. 77 
1. Derivatives Contracts and Hedge Ratio ......................................................................... 78 
2. Derivative Gains and Losses .......................................................................................... 80 
3. Other Control Variables ................................................................................................. 82 
D. Empirical Design and Results ............................................................................................ 85 
1. Hedging Profits and Decomposition of Hedge Ratio ..................................................... 85 
1.1 Decomposition using Industry Mean .......................................................................... 89 
1.2 Decomposition using Regression Predicted Hedge and Residual .............................. 90 
1.3 Decomposition using Fixed Effect Regression Predicted Hedge and Residual ......... 91 
1.4 Decomposing the Profits with Estimated Profits ........................................................ 92 
2. Feedback Effect on Hedging Activities ......................................................................... 93 
E. Robustness Tests ................................................................................................................ 96 
1. Change of Profits and Change of Hedge Ratio .............................................................. 96 
2. Decomposition of Hedge Ratio using Industry Median Hedge ratio ............................. 97 
3. Upstream Oil and Gas Producers ................................................................................... 97 
4. Contracts Mature in the Succeeding Year ...................................................................... 98 
5. Sub-period from 2008 to 2011 ....................................................................................... 99 
F. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 100 
G. References: ....................................................................................................................... 102 







My dissertation focuses primarily on hedge funds and corporate risk management. My 
hedge fund essays mitigate opaqueness in hedge fund industry, identify skilled managers who 
deliver alpha, and allow for successful replication of hedge fund returns originated from risk 
factor exposures. The essays provide value to regulators and investors including college 
endowments. My essay in corporate risk management examines corporate motives for hedging 
and the use of derivatives among oil and gas producers. The essay provides practical insights into 
how hedging motives and effectiveness impact shareholder value.  
In the first essay, I propose a new approach to hedge fund performance evaluation by 
using ETFs as proxies for tradable risk factors in the return attribution factor model framework. 
The model comprehensively spans the space of potential risk factors, dynamically identifying 
specific risk factor exposures out of the entire universe of available ETFs. This results in more 
informative estimates of both alpha and beta coefficients for out-of-sample performance 
compared to other widely used hedge fund return attribution models. The essay finds that the 
portfolio of top alpha hedge funds selected by the model exhibits statistically significant out-of-
sample performance that is substantially better compared to portfolios selected by other models. 
The essay also shows that the hedge fund mimicking portfolios constructed as beta-weighted 
factor portfolios according to the model display substantially higher out-of-sample correlations 
with underlying hedge funds compared to portfolios constructed from other models. 
In the second essay, I propose cloning the best “beta active” hedge funds with ETF 
portfolios. On one hand, I utilize the “beta active” measure to identify the top beta management 
hedge funds that produce the outstanding long-term risk-adjusted performance. On the other 
hand, the cloning procedure allows identifying a homogeneous group of hedge funds suitable for 
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replication, i.e. the ones whose returns are driven by risk factor exposures. By combing the two 
methodologies, I am able to replicate the top beta active cloneable hedge funds who successfully 
capture risk factor exposures that would deliver superior payoff in the future. The resulting 
“smart beta” ETF clone portfolios either match or exceed the risk-adjusted performance of their 
corresponding portfolios of hedge funds. Moreover, the clone portfolios only rely on annual 
rebalancing, and are constructed with a liquid and transparent approach. The methodology allows 
any investor to access active factor strategies employed by hedge funds. 
In the third essay, I examine the use of commodity derivatives by oil and gas producers 
and show that, on average, these firms report gains from their derivative positions. By using a 
hand-collected data, I provide direct evidence that contradicts the risk management theory which 
states that firms use derivatives purely for hedging purposes. The essay shows that the profits 
from derivatives, particularly non-hedge profits, are positively associated with the extent a firm 
hedges and with the extent of hedging that is classified as market timing activities. Finally, the 
essay finds that among firms with losses from derivatives in a prior year, firms with greater 





II. Essay 1: Bringing Order to Chaos: Capturing Relevant Information with Hedge Fund 
Factor Models 1 
Yongjia Li and Alexey Malakhov 
A. Abstract 
We propose using ETF returns as proxies for tradable risk factors in hedge fund 
performance evaluation, identifying contemporaneously relevant risk factors from the entire 
universe of ETFs. Our model provides more informative estimates of alpha and beta coefficients 
for predicting hedge fund out-of-sample performance compared with other widely used hedge 
fund factor models. Portfolios of top alpha hedge funds selected by our model generate 
statistically significant out-of-sample performance that is substantially higher compared with 
portfolios selected by other models. In addition, our beta-weighted clone portfolios exhibit 
substantially higher out-of-sample correlations with underlying hedge funds than clone portfolios 
formed using alternative models. 
JEL Classification: G11, G23 
Keywords: hedge funds, ETFs, risk factor exposures, factor selection, return attribution, alpha, 
beta, active investment, performance prediction 
B. Introduction 
With total assets under management approaching an estimated $3 trillion,2 hedge funds 
are important players in the global financial markets. Absent any restrictions on trading 
                                                     
1 We would like to thank Vikas Agarwal, Wayne Lee, Gulten Mero, Tatiana Salikhova, Anna 
Slavutskaya, Tim Riley, Tim Yeager; participants at the 9th Annual Hedge Fund and Private 
Equity Research Conference; and seminar participants at Boise State University, Fairfield 
University, Miami University, Sam Houston State University, and the University of Arkansas for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. We are especially grateful to Vikas Agarwal for 
generously providing the factor data. 
2 According to Hedge Fund Research, Inc., the global hedge fund capital is $2.898 trillion (July 
20, 2016 press release). 
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strategies, hedge funds epitomize the best in active investment. They are well known for their 
flexibility in implementing a wide variety of strategies, and they portray themselves as alpha 
generators that deliver superior absolute performance to investors.  
Despite numerous models proposed in the literature over the years, there is no universally 
accepted model for hedge fund performance evaluation. We propose a new approach to hedge 
fund performance evaluation by using ETF returns as proxies for tradable risk factors in the 
return attribution factor model framework. The model dynamically identifies specific risk factor 
exposures out of the entire universe of available ETFs, comprehensively spanning the space of 
potential risk factors. This approach results in more informative estimates of alpha and beta 
coefficients for out-of-sample performance prediction compared with other widely used hedge 
fund factor models. 
In the absence of an equilibrium model for hedge fund returns, the proposed hedge fund 
performance evaluation factor models rely on the framework of return attribution3 in introducing 
factors that capture risk exposures imbedded in a diverse set of alternative investments and 
option-like investment strategies.4 Such an approach puts an emphasis on the choice of relevant 
risk factors that drive hedge fund returns, but there is little agreement in the literature on the 
appropriate set of factors. Arguably, it is impossible to even know all the possible risk factors 
that drive hedge fund returns, given the opacity of hedge fund investment strategies and the fact 
                                                     
3 Introduced in Brinson and Fachler (1985), and applied in Sharpe (1992) in the context of 
mutual funds.  
4 See, for example, Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001, 2004), Agarwal and Naik (2000, 2004), 
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007), Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), Bollen and Whaley (2009), Patton 
(2009), Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010), Sadka (2010), Titman and Tiu (2011), 
Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2011), Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012), Bali, Brown, and 
Caglayan (2011, 2012, 2014), Avramov, Barras, and Kosowski (2013), Bollen (2013), Bollen 
and Fisher (2013), Jurek and Stafford (2013), Patton and Ramadorai (2013), and Agarwal, 
Green, and Ren (2016). 
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that the rapid evolution of financial markets continuously expands the space of potential 
investment opportunities. The complexity of hedge fund strategies and the dynamic nature of 
hedge fund performance challenge the reliability and sustainability of return attribution models 
that utilize a fixed number of factors and ignore temporal changes in opportunity sets 
experienced by fund managers; such models run the risk of omitting factors and picking 
irrelevant factors across time. Furthermore, it can be argued that actively managed portfolios of 
hedge fund managers reflect the dynamic information set of contemporaneous state variables in 
the intertemporal framework of Merton (1973). Properly identifying and dynamically adjusting 
the set of risk factors to reflect the relevant information set that influences hedge fund investment 
strategies is therefore paramount for successful return attribution. Successful return attribution 
yields the improved knowledge of the contemporaneous opportunity set, the ability to evaluate 
the skill of hedge fund managers through alpha, and the ability to replicate factor-driven hedge 
fund return performance through beta-weighted clone portfolios. 
In this paper, we employ ETF returns as tradable proxies for potential risk factors. In our 
view, any automatically executed series of returns represents a proxy for a risk factor; hence, 
ETFs represent proxies for the quantifiable risk factors that the market finds contemporaneously 
attractive.5 In other words, the set of available ETFs reflects the dynamic nature of potential risk 
factors that investors care about in their risk-and-return tradeoffs.6 As low cost, liquid and 
transparent investment vehicles, ETFs provide access to a great variety of traditional and exotic 
strategies previously available only to hedge funds or institutional investors.7 Meanwhile, the 
                                                     
5 Evidenced by the capital invested in trading strategies represented by ETFs. 
6 Alternatively, ETFs could be viewed as proxies for unobserved contemporaneous values of 
state variables that are correlated with returns on active investment strategies employed by hedge 
funds. 
7 As an example of available ETF strategies, consider ALPS U.S. Equity High Volatility Put 
Write Index Fund (ticker HVPW) that tracks NYSE Arca U.S. Equity High Volatility Put Write 
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large number of available ETFs allows for complete dynamic spanning of the space of risk 
factors and thus delivers accurate decomposition of alpha and beta. The efficacy of our approach, 
compared to other widely used hedge fund factor models, is demonstrated by the successful 
prediction of the out-of-sample performance of portfolios formed on the basis of the model alpha 
and beta coefficient estimates. 
We utilize the Duanmu, Li, and Malakhov (2016) (DLM thereafter) factor selection 
methodology by selecting appropriate ETF risk factors with cluster analysis and the LAR 
LASSO regression technique,8 while simultaneously estimating the free coefficient, alpha (DLM 
alpha hereafter).9 We estimate historical DLM alpha for individual hedge funds on a rolling 24-
month basis, and conduct out-of-sample portfolio tests based on the ranking of each fund’s 
historical DLM alpha. We consider annual rebalancing, thus incorporating active factor choices 
by hedge fund managers, and hence capturing the dynamic nature of factors that could be driving 
hedge fund performance. We focus on the out-of-sample testing of performance persistence, 
demonstrating the efficacy of the DLM model in delivering tangible benefits to investors.  
First, we find strong evidence that the DLM model alpha is effective in predicting the 
out-of-sample performance of hedge funds. The portfolio of top DLM alpha hedge funds delivers 
significantly positive mean excess returns along with risk-adjusted performance including Sharpe 
ratios, alphas, and information ratios out-of-sample. The top decile portfolio generates an out-of-
                                                     
Index with an annual expense ratio of 0.95 percent. The ETF benchmark tracks the performance 
of options sold on a basket of 20 stocks chosen from the largest-capitalized equities that have the 
highest volatility, as determined by NYSE Arca Inc. 
8 See Tibshirani (1996) and Efron, Hastie, Johnstone, and Tibshirani (2004) for descriptions of 
LASSO and LAR methodologies.  
9 While the original Duanmu, Li, and Malakhov (2014) methodology does not include alpha, our 
alpha calculation in this paper is derived from the DLM methodology with the additional 
consideration of a free coefficient. Hence we refer to it as “DLM alpha”. 
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sample average monthly alpha of 0.53% across benchmark models10 and is significant at the 1% 
level. The significance of alpha is also robust if we expand the number of funds in the portfolio 
to the top quintile.  This finding suggests that the top hedge fund managers selected by the DLM 
model possess active management skills valuable to investors. 
Second, we find that the DLM model delivers substantially higher predictive power in 
out-of-sample performance persistence relative to alternative models. We conduct a horse race to 
compare the DLM model against prevailing factor-based models, including the basic CAPM 
model; the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model; the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model; the 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) option-based model; the Fung and Hsieh (2004) trend-following 
model; the Agarwal, Green, and Ren (2016) 12-factor model; and the Agarwal, Green, and Ren 
(2016) 15-factor max R2 model.11 The portfolio of top DLM alpha hedge funds dominates the top 
portfolios selected by the other models in returns, Sharpe ratios, out-of-sample alphas, and 
information ratios. The results imply that the DLM model provides a more precise hedge fund 
return attribution and identifies the active funds that deliver persistent out-of-sample 
performance. Unlike the other hedge fund factor models, the DLM model identifies 
contemporaneous risk factor exposures in a parsimonious manner while successfully capturing 
the active component of hedge fund returns represented by alpha.  
We further show that the DLM model captures relevant information unrecovered by other 
models, while simultaneously capturing most of the other models’ informative content. We do so 
by considering “mutually exclusive” portfolios that isolate the top alpha funds unique to each 
model. Excluding the funds from the top DLM alpha portfolio that are also present in alternative 
                                                     
10 We calculate the out-of-sample portfolio alphas using multiple factor models to illustrate that 
the success of the DLM model is not an artifact of a particular model. 
11 We are grateful to Vikas Agarwal for generously providing the factor data. We also thank 
Kenneth French and David Hsieh for making their data available online. 
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model portfolios, we find that the remaining top DLM alpha funds deliver superior and 
significant out-of-sample performance. In contrast, the out-of-sample performance of alternative 
model portfolios is weaker and loses significance after excluding the funds from those portfolios 
that are also present in the top DLM alpha portfolio. The results suggest that the DLM model 
incorporates most of the informative content of the other models and also captures relevant 
information unrecovered by other models. 
Finally, we demonstrate the ability of the DLM model to accurately attribute hedge fund 
returns to underlying factor exposures relative to alternative models. We form beta-weighted 
factor clone portfolios, attempting to replicate the factor-driven component of hedge fund 
returns. We expect to see successful return attribution through high out-of-sample correlations of 
hedge fund returns with their beta-weighted factor clones. Consistent with our hypothesis, we 
find that the DLM beta-weighted factor clone portfolios display substantially higher out-of-
sample correlations with underlying hedge funds compared with portfolios constructed from 
other models.  
C. Related Literature 
There have been numerous attempts in the literature at hedge fund performance 
evaluation, but no universally accepted model or approach has emerged. Virtually all proposed 
approaches, either explicitly or implicitly, rely on the framework of return attribution, as there is 
no equilibrium model for hedge fund returns. Introduced in Brinson and Fachler (1985), and 
applied for mutual funds return attribution in Sharpe (1992), return attribution relies on 
introducing benchmark factors that share risk-and-return profiles with portfolios to be evaluated. 
Given the complexity of hedge fund investment strategies, identifying the appropriate set of 
benchmark risk factors is not an easy task. Over the years, a number of factors models and 
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specific factors that reflect risk-and-return profiles of hedge fund investment strategies have been 
introduced.12 The number of factors that could be relevant to attributing at least some aspect of 
potential hedge fund risk-and-return profiles is so large that it is impossible to include all of them 
in a single model without overspecification, and many approaches rely on statistical selection 
techniques for successful return attribution.13 However, most of the mentioned models are either 
static or only consider a fixed number of potential risk factors. 
The dynamic nature of factor exposures in managed portfolios was first explored in 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) in the context of mutual funds. Ferson and Schadt (1996) capture time 
variation in mutual fund factor exposures by conditioning on public information variables, 
following the conceptual framework of Merton (1973).14 Building on Ferson and Schadt (1996), 
Patton and Ramadorai (2013) investigate high-frequency dynamic factor exposures in hedge 
funds and condition on monthly and daily public information variables. Patton and Ramadorai 
(2013) find substantial variation in hedge fund risk exposures across time. Bollen and Whaley 
(2009) and Cai and Liang (2012b) do not directly condition on public variables, capturing the 
dynamic nature of hedge fund factor exposures with the optimal changepoint regression 
                                                     
12 For example, Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004), Agarwal and Naik (2004), and Jurek and Stafford 
(2013) introduce trend following and option based factors, Sadka (2010) introduces the liquidity 
factor, Bollen and Fisher (2013) rely on futures based factors, Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) 
introduce the macroeconomic uncertainty risk factor, and Agarwal, Arisoy, and Naik (2016) 
introduce the volatility of aggregate volatility factor. 
13 For example, Agarwal and Naik (2004), Ammann, Huber, and Schmid (2011), and Titman and 
Tiu (2011) use stepwise regression, S.D.Vrontos, I.D.Vrontos, and Giamouridis (2008) use a 
Bayesian model averaging approach, Bollen and Whaley (2009), Jagannathan, Malakhov, and 
Novikov (2010), and Patton and Ramadorai (2013) use Bayesian Information Criterion and 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion to select risk factors, Giamouridis and Paterlini (2010) and Weber 
and Peres (2013) employ RIDGE, LASSO and LAR LASSO regressions, Agarwal, Green, and 
Ren (2016) use max R2  for factor selection, O’Doherty, Savin, and Tiwari (2016) apply the 
pooled benchmark approach.  
14 Relevant public information variables are interpreted as proxies for the contemporaneous 
information set that active fund managers face.  
10 
 
technique. Meligkotsidou and Vrontos (2008, 2014) develop a Bayesian approach to identify 
structural breaks in hedge fund risk exposures. Billio, Getmansky, and Pelizzon (2012) propose a 
Markov regime switching model, and Cai and Liang (2012a) utilize dynamic regression with 
Kalman filtering for measuring dynamic risk exposures of hedge funds. There are also a few 
studies specifically examining the market timing aspect of the hedge fund dynamic.15 
Our methodology16 is distinct from the previous literature in two aspects. First, we go 
beyond a fixed set of risk factors and comprehensively span the universe of investment 
opportunities with all contemporaneously available ETFs. As the space of hedge fund investment 
opportunities expands due to the evolution of financial markets, it is unlikely that any fixed set of 
public variables would be able to comprehensively capture contemporaneous information sets 
that hedge fund managers face. Utilizing the entire (and continuously expanding) set of available 
ETFs, we comprehensively capture the risk factors that the market finds contemporaneously 
attractive.  
Second, we dynamically use cluster analysis and LAR LASSO regression to 
parsimoniously select the specific factors relevant for each individual hedge fund at any given 
time. While our approach lacks the high-frequency dynamics of correlations with predetermined 
public information variables, it has the advantage of flexibility in selecting factors from the 
expanding and most contemporaneously relevant set of ETFs. In other words, our approach 
involves conditioning on information through the dynamic selection of contemporaneously 
relevant risk factors. The out-of-sample tests confirm the efficacy of this approach in return 
attribution, and assure that the results are not driven by data mining.  
                                                     
15 See, for example, Aragon (2002), Fung, Xu, and Yau (2002), Chen (2007), Chen and Liang 
(2007), Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo (2013), and Duanmu, Malakhov, and McCumber (2016). 
16 Denoted as DLM throughout the paper. 
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Comparison with the widely used factor models,17 shows that the DLM model provides 
superior in-sample matching quality over 24-month rolling windows. The adjusted R-square of 
the DLM model is higher than the adjusted R-square of all other models but one. Meanwhile, the 
mean monthly in-sample alpha of the DLM model is consistently lower than the in-sample 
alphas of other models. The results suggest that the alpha estimated by alternative models could 
be partially attributed to risk factor exposures revealed by the DLM model. The more precisely 
estimated alpha by the DLM model results in substantially better out-of-sample performance of 
the top DLM alpha portfolio relative to portfolios selected by other models. The more precisely 
estimated factor risk exposures by the DLM model result in substantially higher out-of-sample 
correlations between the beta-weighted mimicking factor portfolios and underlying hedge funds 
relative to hedge fund clone portfolios formed using alternative models.  
D. Data 
We obtain hedge fund data from Bloomberg18 for the period from 2003 to 2012 on 
10,506 unique hedge funds,19 of which 2,404 are active and 8,102 are inactive. The compiled 
data includes comprehensive fund information on monthly returns net of management and 
performance fees, assets under management, management styles, and other fund characteristics. 
In order to minimize the survivorship bias, we include live as well as defunct hedge funds that 
                                                     
17 We test our approach against CAPM, Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), Agarwal and 
Naik (2004), Fung and Hsieh (2004), and Agarwal, Green, and Ren (2016) models. 
18 Bloomberg is the most common platform used by both hedge funds, who utilize news, 
analysis, research, and trading tools, and accredited investors, who use Bloomberg data to 
research hedge funds, private equity firms, and other alternative investment vehicles. Bloomberg 
aggregates data on live and dead funds inclusive of fund and parent company descriptions, 
manager and contact information, total assets under management, fees, past performance, and 
management style.  
19 We do not include funds of hedge funds in our sample. 
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were acquired, liquidated, or simply ceased to report during our sample period. We mitigate the 
backfill bias by eliminating the first 24 months of reported returns for each individual fund.20  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of all hedge funds in our sample. Panel A reports that 
the typical hedge fund has a median management fee of 1.5%, a 20% incentive fee, a $250,000 
minimum initial investment, and a 30 day redemption period. Live funds exhibit higher median 
monthly excess returns, larger assets under management, and greater longevity compared with 
defunct funds. Panel B shows that 79% of funds have a high water mark provision, 4% of funds 
impose hurdle rates, and 40% of funds are non-U.S. domiciled. Panel C shows that the most 
common declared style is long-short equity, which accounts for 26% of all funds. 
We utilize the ETF data from Morningstar over the period 2003-2012 on all U.S. listed 
ETFs. Although ETF data are available before 2003, we focus on out-of-sample analysis from 
2005-2012, when more than 100 ETFs per year are available, thus providing a broad coverage of 
potential risk factors. We manually check the description of each ETF and exclude ETFs that are 
not passively managed index tracking funds,21 as well as ETFs that track hedge fund indexes, 
leaving us with 1,313 unique ETFs available over the sample period. Following Duanmu, Li and 
Malakhov (2014), we require at least two years of monthly ETF returns for our analysis, 
reducing the number of ETFs to 786 that are used in our LAR LASSO matching regressions. As 
shown in Figure 1, the number of ETFs has grown considerably over the sample period, which 
expands the space of investment opportunity set, provides broad coverage of risk factors 
available to hedge fund managers, and entails precise performance evaluation of hedge fund 
                                                     
20 The 24-month backfill correction is in line with results in Jagannathan, Malakhov, and 
Novikov (2010) and Titman and Tiu (2011) suggesting dropping the first 25 and 27 months of 
returns. See Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscraft. (1999) and Fung and Hsieh (2000) for the 
backfill bias description. 
21 Benchmark indexes that retained ETFs track may not be publicly available. Some funds track 





1. The DLM Estimation of Alpha 
We conduct performance attribution by augmenting the methodology developed in 
Duanmu, Li, and Malakhov (2014). The methodology employs ETFs as tradable proxies for risk 
factors.  
First, we perform cluster analysis to reduce the potential multicollinearity among the 
comprehensive set of ETFs. We calculate each ETFs distance from the center of its cluster using 
the Strategy Distinctiveness Index (SDI) measure from Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012). This 
distance measure for ETF i is calculated as one minus the correlation of the ETF’s return with 
the mean return of all ETFs from the same cluster I, i.e.  














                             (1) 
The lower the SDI, the closer the ETF is to the center of its cluster. We select the ETF with the 
lowest SDI as a proxy for all the ETFs in that cluster, and we include this ETF as a potential risk 
factor in the regression analysis. This approach mitigates multicollinearity while allowing for 
efficient spanning of the space of potential risk factors. 
Second, we use LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) regression with 
LAR (least angle regression) modification22 to identify the risk factors that drive individual 
hedge fund performance. Introduced by Tibshirani (1996), LASSO is a regression technique that 
performs both regularization and variable selection to improve the prediction accuracy. For a 
                                                     
22 See Hoerl and Kennard (1970), Tibshirani (1996), and Efron, Hastie, Johnstone, and 
Tibshirani (2004) for descriptions of RIDGE, LASSO, and LAR methodologies. 
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given parameter t, LASSO regression identifies an optimal set of factors with non-zero 
coefficients such that 
2
1
ˆ arg min || || ,













                       (2) 
where r is the vector of hedge fund monthly returns in our research and X is the vector of ETF 
monthly returns. 
Given the set of factors, LASSO regression determines the appropriate factors to be 
selected through an optimization approach. In this constrained form of ordinary least squares 
regression, the sum of absolute values of the beta coefficients is estimated and constrained to be 
smaller than a specific fixed value, t. For a given value of t, some of the beta coefficients would 
be set to zero if the corresponding factors reveal little or no information about the dependent 
variable. This approach “shrinks” the set of regression factors until the beta coefficients are the 
solution of the optimization problem, resulting in efficient and parsimonious factor selection. 
The parameter t controls the amount of “shrinkage”, with lower values of t resulting in fewer 
factors being selected for the model. We calculate LASSO regression solutions across a range of 
t values by employing a computationally efficient least angle regression (LAR) modification of 
the LASSO procedure introduced in Efron, Hastie, Johnstone, and Tibshirani (2004). The 
optimal factor model is then selected with the lowest value of the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). As the last step, we estimate factor loadings, β, via the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with the factors selected by the LAR LASSO procedure. In other words, while we rely 
on LAR LASSO for factor selection, we use OLS estimates of the model coefficients. This 
approach allows for the orthogonal decomposition of factor exposures with the error term, which 
is important from the return attribution perspective. 
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Finally, while clustering does mitigate multicollinearity among ETFs in principle, we do 
not know the theoretically optimal number of clusters for each fund.23 We determine the optimal 
number of clusters for each fund empirically by iteratively running cluster analysis and LAR 
LASSO regression for each fund one hundred times, assuming that the ETFs available could be 
sorted into 1 to 100 clusters. We set the maximum number to 100 because we believe it is an 
efficient and sufficiently large set of investment opportunities. Consequently, each individual 
hedge fund has one hundred corresponding models with unique selection parameters. We choose 
the model with the highest adjusted R-square as the final factor model. 
To capture the dynamic nature of hedge funds’ investment activities, we run the LAR 
LASSO regression with OLS-estimated coefficients for each individual fund over 24-month 
windows, rolling annually over the sample period.24 We use the factor model as a dynamic 
benchmark to obtain estimates of alpha. The basic regression model is as follows: 
, 1 1 2 2 100 100( ) ( ) ... ( ) ,                    (3)i net f i i f i f i f ir r ETF r ETF r ETF r               
where ri,net is the net monthly return of fund i, and rf is the risk-free rate proxied by the monthly 
return of the 30-day U.S. Treasury bill. We do not restrict beta coefficients to be positive nor add 
up to one, because hedge funds are flexible in their investment options to take leverage and short 
positions.25 It is worth mentioning that the regression model is different from that in Duanmu, Li, 
                                                     
23 On the one hand, selecting too few clusters works well for resolving multicollinearity, but 
results in the loss of potentially informative factors. On the other hand, selecting too many 
clusters provides wider coverage of the factor space, while hindering the effectiveness of the 
LAR LASSO procedure by relatively high levels of multicollinearity. 
24 We focus on annual rolling estimates because of high illiquidity of hedge fund investments 
from an investor perspective. Given typical lockup and redemption notice restrictions in the 
hedge fund industry, it is not reasonable to assume that investors would be able to rebalance their 
hedge fund portfolios with higher frequencies.  
25 For example, ter Horst, Nijman, and de Roon (2004) demonstrate that imposing unwarranted 
style based constraints can lead to biased risk exposure estimates. 
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and Malakhov (2014) in three respects. First, Duanmu, Li, and Malakhov (2014) use gross hedge 
fund returns on the left-hand side with the intention of fully replicating hedge fund returns before 
fees. We use net hedge fund returns here, because we seek to evaluate returns from the 
perspective of performance attribution, and we are interested in evaluating hedge fund 
performance after fees.26 Second, Duanmu, Li, and Malakhov (2014) suppress the intercept, 
focusing on cloning of total hedge fund returns. However, we are particularly interested in the 
intercept, αi, which is the DLM alpha estimate for fund i over the regression time window. Third, 
we estimate factor loadings, βij, via the ordinary least squares regression with the factors selected 
by the LAR LASSO procedure. This method allows for the orthogonal decomposition of factor 
exposures with the error term. 
2. Comparison of Performance Evaluation Models 
In order to investigate whether the DLM methodology quantifies the relevant risk factor 
exposures and produce informative alpha and beta estimates, we compare our model against 
prevailing factor models proposed by extent research. The models and corresponding factors 
include: 
CAPM model: the basic single market factor (MKTRF) model. 
Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model (denoted FF3): factors include market factor 
(MKTRF), size factor (SMB) and value factor (HML). 
Carhart (1997) 4-factor model (denoted Carhart4): Fama and French 3-factors and 
momentum factor (UMD) 
                                                     
26 Considering the net-of-fees hedge fund returns also enables direct comparisons of our model 
with the alternative hedge fund factor models that rely on the net-of-fees approach. 
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Agarwal and Naik (2004) 6-factor27 model (denoted AN6): Carhart 4-factors, an out-of-
the-money call option factor (OTM_CALL), and an out-of-the-money put option factor 
(OTM_PUT). 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) 8-factor28 model (denoted FH8): A market risk premium proxied 
by the S&P 500 index excess return (SP500), an equity size premium proxied by Russell 2000 
Index return minus the S&P 500 Index return (SizeSpread), the MSCI Emerging Market index 
excess return (EM), the monthly excess return of a 10-year U.S. treasury bond proxied by the 10-
year U.S. Treasury bond portfolio excess return from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(10Year), a fixed income-based risk factor calculated as the total return on the Citi BBB 
corporate bond index minus the total return on the Fama U.S. Treasury bond portfolio as per 
CRSP (CreditSpread), and excess returns on trend-following factors constructed of lookback 
straddles on futures contracts of bonds (BondTrend), commodities (ComTrend), and currencies 
(FxTrend), respectively. 
Agarwal, Green, and Ren (2016) 12-factor model (denoted 12-factor): Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) 8-factors, size factor (SMB), value factor (HML), out-of-the-money call option factor 
(OTM_CALL), and out-of-the-money put option factor (OTM_PUT). 
Agarwal, Green, and Ren (2016) 15-factor max R2 model (denoted Max R2): Agarwal, 
Green, and Ren 12-factor plus the return on VIX (RETVIX), a liquidity risk factor (LIQ),29 and a 
                                                     
27 This is a modified version of Agarwal and Naik (2004) model proposed in Agarwal, Green, 
and Ren (2016). 
28 While Fung and Hsieh (2004) specify the seven factor model, the updated specification on 
David Hsieh’s web site at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm includes eight 
factors. 
29 See Sadka (2010). 
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macroeconomic uncertainty risk factor (UNCTIDX).30 The optimal factors are selected based on 
the criterion of maximum adjusted R-square. 
Consistent with the previously described methodology, we use 24-month window 
regressions to estimate alphas for these models, rolling annually. For example, equation (4) 
illustrates the Fung and Hsieh (2004) eight factors model regression:  
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
 - 500 10
            .               (4)
i f i i i i i
i i i i i
r r SP EM Year SizeSpread
CreditSpread BondTrend ComTrend FxTrend
    
    
     
   
 
The regression intercept αi represents the FH8 alpha of fund i. β1, β2,…, β8 are the FH8 
beta coefficients of fund i. 
3. Out-of-Sample Testing of Performance Persistence  
To highlight the effectiveness of the DLM model in providing informative estimates and 
offering tangible benefits to investors, we conduct our analysis of the efficacy of alpha and beta 
coefficients in the framework of out-of-sample performance persistence.  
We demonstrate the efficacy of DLM alpha estimates by considering the out-of-sample 
performance of portfolios based on the rank of in-sample alphas. The portfolio approach also 
minimizes the out-of-sample survivorship bias because all hedge funds are considered until they 
disappear from the database. By sorting hedge funds on historical alpha, we form DLM alpha 
portfolios on January 1st, 2005. We invest the same dollar amount into each hedge fund within a 
portfolio in the beginning, and track its net-of-fees performance until December 31, 2012, 
rebalancing it once a year based on updated in-sample regression alphas. When a hedge fund 
disappears from the database, we redistribute the remaining capital in the fund equally amongst 
                                                     
30 See Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014). 
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surviving funds in the portfolio.31 This procedure produces a time series of 96 monthly returns 
for hedge fund portfolios, which is then used to evaluate long-term portfolio performance across 
diverse economic conditions. We calculate end-of-sample dollar values based upon a $1 initial 
investment, mean excess monthly returns, Sharpe ratios, and attrition rates for each time series of 
monthly portfolio returns from January 2005 until December 2012. Importantly, since the out-of-
sample alpha is sensitive to the benchmark model used, we calculate multiple out-of-sample 
portfolio alphas and information ratios by regressing the time series of portfolio returns on every 
model.32 We apply the same procedure to form CAPM, FF3, Carhart4, AN6, FH8, 12-Factor, 
and Max R2 portfolios and examine their out-of-sample performance respectively. This approach 
provides an impartial comparison of the tangible out-of-sample benefit provided by each model 
alpha estimates.  
We demonstrate the efficacy of the DLM beta estimates relative to other models by 
considering the out-of-sample performance of beta-weighted hedge fund clones compared to the 
underlying hedge funds. For every hedge fund we construct beta–weighted clone portfolios 
based on factors and corresponding beta estimates from each model. The more effective selection 
of relevant factors along with more informative estimates of beta coefficients results in higher 
out-of-sample matching quality for individual funds proxied by out-of-sample correlations 
between the beta-weighted clones and the underlying hedge funds, and the adjusted R-squares 
from regressions of the beta-weighted clones on the underlying hedge funds.  
  
                                                     
31 This is somewhat conservative as it is possible that a fund simply chooses to stop reporting to 
the database, which is likely for well performing funds that are no longer accepting new investor 
flows. However, without returns data we obviously cannot keep the fund in the portfolio. 
32 For Agarwal, Green, and Ren (2016) 15-factor Max R2 model, we calculate the out-of-sample 
alpha based on Max R2 approach which maximizes the explanatory power of risk factors. See 
Agarwal, Green, and Ren (2016). 
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F. Empirical Results 
1. In-Sample Matching and Out-of-Sample Portfolio - DLM Model 
As described in the previous section, our in-sample matching procedure is based on LAR 
LASSO regression with OLS estimates of coefficients. Table 2 reports the results for annual 
rolling two-year matching regressions from 2005 to 2012. The results suggest that on average 
hedge funds do not produce high alphas in the sample period. The average in-sample monthly 
DLM alpha between 2005 and 2012 is 0.04%, and most alphas are negative in the first half of the 
sample period. The average matching adjusted R-square is 0.60, and it rises over time indicating 
an improved matching quality. The average number of factors selected by LAR LASSO is 2.51 
for the whole sample period, which suggests that our model results in a parsimonious factor 
selection.  
We apply the portfolio approach to analyzing the out-of-sample performance of hedge 
funds. To highlight the predictive power of DLM alpha on performance persistence, we first sort 
hedge funds into deciles on the basis of in-sample DLM alpha. The out-of-sample performance 
of hedge funds in top and bottom DLM alpha deciles is presented in Table 3 Panel A. The top 
hedge fund portfolio delivers a portfolio end value of $2.21, a significant mean monthly return of 
0.72%, and a significant Sharpe ratio of 0.29. In addition, the portfolio exhibits a low attrition 
rate of 7.62% relative to the attrition rate of 12.96% across all hedge funds in our sample. On the 
other hand, the portfolio of hedge funds in the bottom DLM alpha decile fails to provide 
significant risk-adjusted performance and has a much higher attrition rate of 20.70%. Although 
we are not able to take short positions on the hedge fund with bottom DLM alpha, the result still 
provides valuable information on screening unskilled hedge funds. Furthermore, we increase the 
number of funds in the out-of-sample portfolios by considering hedge funds in the top and 
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bottom quintile of DLM alpha. The results in Panel B show that robust risk-adjusted 
performance still holds when more hedge funds are included in the portfolio. 
2. In-Sample Matching and Out-of-Sample Portfolio - All Models 
We then investigate the in-sample matching statistics of all models during the whole 
sample period. Table 4 shows that the average in-sample DLM alpha is significantly lower than 
alphas estimated by other models. On the other hand, the DLM model yields better in-sample 
matching as measured by higher adjusted R-square. The average in-sample DLM adjusted R-
square is much higher than all other models except the Max R2 model. The difference may 
suggest that a proportion of hedge fund returns, which other models consider not attributable, 
could be attributed to risk factors identified by the DLM model. Moreover, although DLM model 
explores a comprehensive set of potential risk factors, it only selects an average of 2.51 factors, 
which is parsimonious compared to other multifactor models. The dynamic Max R2 model 
provides the highest in-sample adjusted R-square; however, its average number of factors 
selected and standard deviation of the number of factors are both higher than that of the DLM 
model. 
In an out-of-sample portfolio horse race, we validate whether the DLM model delivers 
superior risk-adjusted performance by comparing it with the other models. As described 
previously, for each model we form an out-of-sample portfolio sorted on in-sample alpha, and 
we compare the risk-adjusted performance among different models. Tables 5 and 6 report the 
comparison results.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the portfolio formed on the top decile of DLM alpha 
dominates the performance of other model portfolios in mean monthly excess return, portfolio 
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end value, and Sharpe ratio. We consider quintile portfolios in Panel B and find consistent 
results.  
Table 6 examines the out-of-sample alpha and information ratio of each portfolio. 
Because out-of-sample alpha is sensitive to the benchmark model used, we calculate multiple 
out-of-sample portfolio alphas by regressing the time series of portfolio returns on every model. 
This approach allows for an impartial comparison of the tangible out-of-sample benefit provided 
by each model. It is worth noting that it is impossible to use the DLM model as a benchmark for 
evaluating alpha with a consistent set of factors for the entire time period because the universe of 
ETF factors changes across time. Therefore, we calculate out-of-sample portfolio alphas by using 
all other models except the DLM model. In Panel A, for example, the DLM column represents 
the out-of-sample portfolio formed on the top decile of in-sample DLM alpha. This portfolio 
delivers a monthly CAPM alpha of 0.58%, a monthly FH8 alpha of 0.49%, and a monthly Max 
R2 alpha of 0.51%. The DLM model dominates other models on all risk-adjusted alpha measures 
including CAPM alpha, FF3 alpha, Carhart4 alpha, AN6 alpha, FH8 alpha, 12-Factor alpha and 
Max R2 alpha. Remarkably, all of the out-of-sample alphas provided by the DLM model are 
statistically significant at 1% level. The superior performance holds consistently in Panel B 
where we form portfolios using quintile specification. The CAPM, FH8, 12-Factor and Max R2 
models show some predictive power of future performance but the predictive power is much 
weaker than that of the DLM model. Furthermore, we find that the top portfolios sorted on AN6 
option-based model fail to predict out-of-sample risk-adjusted performance, while the bottom 
portfolios sorted on the AN6 model deliver somewhat significant mean returns, Sharpe ratios, 
and out-of-sample alphas. Panels C and D report out-of-sample information ratios. Not 
surprisingly, the DLM model still outperforms other models. 
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3. Relationship with the Other Models 
In this section, we show that the DLM model captures relevant information unrecovered 
by other models, while capturing most of the other models’ informative content. Table 7 presents 
performance metrics from “mutually exclusive” portfolios that isolate the top alpha funds unique 
to each model. For example, the column “DLM Ex CAPM” in Panel A includes hedge funds 
present in the top decile of the DLM alpha portfolio, but not present in top decile of the CAPM 
alpha portfolio, and the column “CAPM Ex DLM” includes hedge funds present in the top decile 
of the CAPM alpha portfolio but not present in top decile of the DLM alpha portfolio. 
Interestingly, when we exclude funds from the DLM portfolio that also present in alternative 
factor model portfolios, we find that the remaining DLM funds deliver statistically significant 
out-of-sample performance including end value, mean excess returns, Sharpe ratios, out-of-
sample alphas, and information ratios. The opposite, however, is not true. When we exclude 
funds from the alternative factor model portfolios that also present in the DLM portfolio, the 
predictive power remains insignificant or becomes weaker. The quintile specification in Panel B 
provides similar evidence. The results suggest that the DLM model exhibits superior predictive 
power by incorporating most of the informative content of the other models and capturing 
relevant information unrecovered by other models. 
We further investigate the relationship among the models by summarizing correlations 
between the in-sample alphas of different models in Panel A of Table 8, and correlations 
between the in-sample adjusted R-squares in Panel B. We find that the DLM in-sample alpha has 
relatively high positive correlations with CAPM, FF3, Carhart4 AN6 and FH8 alphas, and 
relatively low positive correlations with 12-Factor and Max R2 alphas, which utilize more risk 
factors. On the other hand, the DLM in-sample R-square has a relatively high positive correlation 
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with the FH8 R-square and a moderately positive correlation with other R-squares. 
4. Longer-Term Persistence of Performance 
We argue that the truly skillful managers should be able to deliver persistent 
outperformance through time. Therefore, instead of rebalancing the portfolio annually, we 
conduct portfolio rebalancing over two-year intervals. For example, in the scenario of two-year 
rebalancing for DLM model, we form DLM portfolios on January 1st, 2005, rebalancing it once 
every two years based on updated in-sample DLM alphas. We are particularly interested in 
whether the superior performance in skilled managers33 is able to persist with respect to longer 
rebalancing intervals. 
Table 9 Panel A presents the out-of-sample performance of top decile portfolios. We 
show that the portfolio in the top decile of DLM alpha is able to deliver dominant risk-adjusted 
performance, with higher end value, Sharpe ratio, information ratio, mean monthly return and 
out-of-sample alpha compared with other models. The approach is applied to the top quintile 
alpha portfolios in Panel B, and the results largely remain. The finding provides evidence of 
persistence in the performance of funds selected on DLM alpha - either a hedge fund manager 
has the skill or does not. The DLM model alpha identifies the talented hedge funds that possess 
active investment skill and are able to provide the long-term absolute performance to investors. 
5. Quality of Out-of-Sample Individual Beta-Weighted Matches 
Finally, to directly validate the efficacy of the DLM model in selecting relevant risk 
factors and producing informative estimates of beta coefficients, we compare the out-of-sample 
performance of beta-weighted hedge fund clones with the performance of the underlying hedge 
funds. We construct hedge fund clones for each hedge fund as a beta-loaded portfolio of risk 
                                                     
33 We argue that the alpha from a return attribution model that successfully captures risk factor 
exposures could be interpreted as a proxy for managerial skill. 
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factors, with the beta weights and the factors determined from in-sample regressions. The out-of-
sample hedge fund clone performance after the in-sample matching period is given by  
, , , 1 , ,
1
 (  ),                                   (5)
n
i t f t j t j t f t
j
Clone Return r Factor Return r 

    
where βj,t-1 is the factor coefficient from the previous two-year in-sample regression.  
Table 10 presents the out-of-sample correlations between the beta-weighted clones and 
the underlying hedge funds for each model in Panel A, and the out-of-sample adjusted R-squares 
from regressions of the beta-weighted clones on the underlying hedge funds in Panel B. We find 
that the average out-of-sample correlation of the DLM model is the highest among all models in 
the sample period from 2005 to 2012. The DLM adjusted R-square is also consistently higher 
than that of other models across the sample period. The results indicate that the hedge fund 
mimicking portfolios constructed as beta-weighted factor portfolios according to our model 
display considerably better out-of-sample matches with underlying hedge funds compared to 
portfolios constructed from other models. This result is consistent with the interpretation of the 
higher efficacy in hedge fund return attribution of the DLM model by selecting more 
contemporaneously relevant risk factors and producing more informative estimates of beta 
coefficients relative to alternative models. 
G. Conclusion 
Properly identifying the risk factors underlying hedge fund investment strategies and 
dynamically adjusting the set of factors to reflect the current information set is paramount for 
successful return attribution in active investments vehicles. There has been a growing interest 
among researchers and practitioners to decompose hedge fund returns to a replicable beta 
component and an active alpha component.  
This research redefines performance evaluation by employing ETFs as tradable proxies to 
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capture the intertemporal aspect of the information set. We select ETF risk factors with cluster 
analysis and LAR LASSO regression procedure, while simultaneously estimating the free 
coefficient, alpha. The methodology demonstrates substantial improvement in hedge fund 
performance attribution compared to the commonly used factor models. The benefits of 
successful return attribution include the improved knowledge of the contemporaneous 
information set, the ability to evaluate the skill of hedge fund managers through alpha, and the 
ability to make beta-driven investments without investing in hedge funds by forming beta-
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Figure 1: Number of ETFs, 1999-2012  
 
Number of ETFs available, and number of ETFs used in LASSO regressions are reported. ETF 









Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Summary statistics of all hedge funds from 2003-2012. Panel A reports returns, fees, and 
investor liquidity measures. Panel B reports means of indicator variables of fund characteristics, 





Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct Std
Monthly excess return 0.15 0.27 -1.25 1.37 4.57
Assets ($M) 208.33 44.55 3.68 368.47 1462.98
Min Invest ($M) 1.36 0.25 0.03 1 12.84
Mgmt Fee (%) 1.50 1.50 0.75 2 0.65
Perf Fee (%) 17.21 20 0 20 7.09
Hurdle Rate (%) 0.31 0 0 0 1.60
Lockup Period (days) 76.11 0 0 360 251.67
Redemption Notice (days) 12.29 0 0 45 26.65
Redemption Period (days) 51.52 30 30 90 52.00
Total Redemption (days) 64.77 35 30 120 62.16
Longevity (months) 41.74 33 6 96 33.59
Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct Std
Monthly excess return 0.73 0.57 -0.22 1.51 6.23
Assets ($M) 258.62 85.35 9.86 653.28 582.74
Min Invest ($M) 1.47 0.25 0.03 1 12.35
Mgmt Fee (%) 1.51 1.50 0.85 2 0.62
Perf Fee (%) 17.20 20 0 20 6.93
Hurdle Rate (%) 0.36 0 0 0 1.68
Lockup Period (days) 86.38 0 0 360 370.65
Redemption Notice (days) 21.60 2 0 65 32.39
Redemption Period (days) 49.65 30 7 90 52.22
Total Redemption (days) 71.76 55 21 150 67.44
Longevity (months) 56.52 48 11 120 38.37
Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct Std
Monthly excess return -0.02 0.16 -1.54 1.29 3.92
Assets ($M) 193.61 35.99 2.94 292.82 1,632.95
Min Invest ($M) 1.33 0.25 0.03 1 12.99
Mgmt Fee (%) 1.50 1.50 0.75 2 0.66
Perf Fee (%) 17.21 20 0 20 7.14
Hurdle Rate (%) 0.29 0 0 0 1.57
Lockup Period (days) 72.67 0 0 360 196.22
Redemption Notice (days) 9.41 0 0 30 23.88
Redemption Period (days) 52.14 30 30 90 51.91
Total Redemption (days) 62.44 30 30 120 60.13
Longevity (months) 37.36 29 5 83 30.69
Full Sample (10,506 unique funds)
Active Funds (2,404 unique funds)
Inactive Funds (8,102 unique funds)
32 
 




Panel B - Indicator
Full Sample Active Funds
Inactive 
Funds
High Water Mark 0.79 0.87 0.77
Hurdle Rate 0.04 0.06 0.04
Offshore (non-US) 0.40 0.38 0.41
Closed to New Inv 0.05 0.05 0.04
Liquidated 0.37 0.00 0.48
Acquired 0.03 0.00 0.03
Panel C - Fund Styles
Full Sample Active Funds
Inactive 
Funds
Long-Short 0.26 0.26 0.26
Multi Strategy 0.12 0.12 0.12
Undisclosed 0.08 0.00 0.11
Market Neutral 0.06 0.05 0.06
Long Biased 0.05 0.07 0.04
Discretionary 0.05 0.04 0.05
Fixed Income Diversified 0.05 0.06 0.04
Systematic 0.05 0.08 0.03
Discretionary Thematic 0.04 0.05 0.04
Emerging Market 0.03 0.04 0.03
Macro Diversified 0.03 0.03 0.03
Distressed Securities 0.02 0.01 0.02
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.02 0.02 0.02
Statistical Arbitrage 0.02 0.01 0.02
Systematic Diversified 0.02 0.03 0.01
Merger Arbitrage 0.01 0.01 0.02
Convertible Arbitrage 0.01 0.01 0.02
Event Driven Diversified 0.01 0.02 0.01
Cap Structure/Credit Arbitrage 0.01 0.01 0.01
Emerging Market Debt 0.01 0.01 0.01
Asset-Backed Securities 0.01 0.02 0.01
Currency 0.01 0.01 0.01
Equity Hedge Diversified 0.01 0.01 0.01
Mortgage-Backed 0.01 0.01 0.01
Special Situation 0.01 0.01 0.00
Short Biased 0.00 0.00 0.00





Table 2: In-Sample Statistics, DLM Model 
 
In-sample LASSO matching regression results for the sample period 2005-2012 are reported. 
Regressions are run over 24-month window, rolling annually. ETFs Used represent all ETFs 
available for LASSO regressions, while ETFs Selected represent ETFs that were selected by 
LASSO as regressors for individual hedge funds. Mean excess returns, DLM alphas, LASSO 
adjusted R-squares, BIC values, and numbers of matched LASSO regressors are reported for 




0.36 0.08 0.51 25.13 2.49
(1.41) (1.04) (0.23) (38.54) (1.41)
0.71 -0.13 0.55 17.73 2.31
(1.33) (0.92) (0.23) (36.58) (1.32)
0.58 -0.08 0.56 17.61 2.43
(1.27) (0.81) (0.22) (34.41) (1.36)
-1.75 -0.04 0.60 18.12 2.65
(3.15) (0.91) (0.22) (34.37) (1.51)
1.42 -0.08 0.65 34.78 2.68
(2.87) (1.19) (0.26) (32.6) (1.62)
0.71 0.11 0.65 43.84 2.54
(1.63) (1.4) (0.23) (30.76) (1.38)
-0.47 0.37 0.63 31.69 2.54
(1.48) (1.51) (0.24) (33.85) (1.42)
0.38 0.06 0.67 26.18 2.47
(2.19) (1.06) (0.24) (32.69) (1.29)
Average 0.24 0.04 0.60 26.89 2.51
2010-2011 3116 786 134
2008-2009 2598 539 133
2009-2010 2913 680 138
2006-2007 2310 201 127
2007-2008 2381 332 123
2004-2005 1629 119 108


















Table 3: Out-of-Sample Portfolios, DLM Model 
 
Annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performances of portfolios formed on the basis of 
in-sample matching regression DLM alphas. Portfolios of hedge funds are formed on January 1, 
2005, and rebalanced annually on updated DLM alphas. End values are as of December 31, 
2012. Attrition rates are calculated as averages across annual rates at which hedge funds 
disappear from the database; resultant capital is assumed to be equally invested in remaining 
portfolio hedge funds. Panel A reports results for top (bottom) decile portfolios formed on the 
basis of in-sample DLM alphas. Panel B reports results for top (bottom) quintile portfolios 
formed on the basis of in-sample DLM alphas. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
designated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  












2005 134 130 20.26 134 120 7.12
2006 163 156 20.98 163 138 12.91
2007 200 182 15.32 200 160 13.15
2008 232 197 -11.00 232 168 -7.26
2009 239 222 19.28 239 184 52.14
2010 260 249 22.17 260 209 7.74
2011 292 265 -7.97 292 221 -13.20
2012 312 284 10.45 312 233 -5.68
End Value 2.21 1.70
Mean Return 0.72*** 0.48
(t-stat) (2.84) (1.24)
Sharpe Ratio 0.29*** 0.13
(t-stat) (2.76) (1.23)
Attrition rate 7.62% 20.70%
DLM Alpha Top Decile DLM Alpha Btm Decile
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2005 267 261 14.90 267 236 5.84
2006 326 313 16.52 326 286 16.04
2007 399 365 14.54 399 337 13.50
2008 463 398 -13.66 463 333 -12.51
2009 477 444 17.41 477 369 41.73
2010 520 489 16.61 520 407 9.08
2011 583 527 -6.66 583 454 -11.45
2012 624 560 8.77 624 480 -0.83
End Value 1.84 1.66
Mean Return 0.52** 0.43
(t-stat) (2.22) (1.30)
Sharpe Ratio 0.23** 0.13
(t-stat) (2.18) (1.28)
Attrition rate 7.69% 19.63%
DLM Alpha Top Quintile DLM Alpha Btm Quintile
36 
 
Table 4: Comparison of In-Sample Statistics 
 
In-sample matching regression results for the sample period 2005-2012 are reported for each 
model. Regressions are run over 24-month window, rolling annually. Models include CAPM, 
FF3, Carhart4, AN6, FH8, 12-Factor, Max R2, and DLM. Means and standard deviations of 







Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
CAPM 0.35 1.05 0.24 0.23 1 -
FF3 0.26 1.07 0.27 0.26 3 -
Carhart4 0.21 1.06 0.29 0.26 4 -
AN6 0.19 1.39 0.30 0.27 6 -
FH8 0.22 1.14 0.38 0.23 8 -
12-Factor 0.25 1.70 0.40 0.32 12 -
Max R
2 0.64 3.12 0.66 0.19 7.75 2.22






Table 5: Out-of-Sample Performance, Portfolio Comparison 
 
The table reports annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performance measures of 
portfolios formed on the basis of in-sample matching regression alphas for each model. 
Portfolios of hedge funds are formed on January 1, 2005, and rebalanced annually on updated in-
sample alphas. End values are as of December 31, 2012. Attrition rates are calculated as average 
annual rates at which hedge funds disappear from the database; resultant capital is assumed to be 
equally invested in remaining portfolio hedge funds. Panel A reports results for top (bottom) 
decile portfolios formed on the basis of in-sample alphas for each model. Panel B reports results 
for top (bottom) quintile portfolios formed on the basis of in-sample alphas for each model. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A - Out-of-Sample Portfolio Performance, Deciles
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
End Value 2.04 1.76 1.83 1.59 1.83 1.83 2.02 2.21
0.66* 0.50 0.54* 0.38 0.52* 0.53* 0.64** 0.72***
(1.88) (1.47) (1.65) (1.3) (1.92) (1.79) (1.99) (2.84)
0.19* 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.19* 0.18* 0.20** 0.29***
(1.86) (1.46) (1.63) (1.29) (1.89) (1.76) (1.96) (2.76)
Attrition Rate 6.68% 7.23% 7.69% 8.35% 7.69% 10.42% 10.24% 7.62%
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
End Value 1.37 1.64 1.79 2.11 1.49 1.81 1.62 1.70
0.24 0.44 0.53 0.71* 0.34 0.54 0.43 0.48
(0.70) (1.19) (1.44) (1.77) (0.89) (1.40) (1.10) (1.24)
0.07 0.12 0.15 0.18* 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.13
(0.70) (1.19) (1.43) (1.76) (0.89) (1.39) (1.10) (1.23)













Panel B - Out-of-Sample Portfolio Performance, Quintiles
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
End Value 1.89 1.66 1.69 1.45 1.68 1.70 1.75 1.84
0.56* 0.43 0.44 0.28 0.43* 0.44* 0.48* 0.52**
(1.83) (1.44) (1.54) (1.00) (1.72) (1.72) (1.66) (2.22)
0.19* 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.17* 0.17* 0.17* 0.23**
(1.81) (1.43) (1.53) (1.00) (1.70) (1.70) (1.65) (2.18)
Attrition Rate 7.02% 7.39% 7.61% 8.78% 7.99% 9.95% 10.69% 7.69%
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
End Value 1.50 1.71 1.74 1.92 1.56 1.67 1.67 1.66
0.32 0.46 0.48 0.59* 0.38 0.45 0.44 0.43
(1.06) (1.45) (1.53) (1.75) (1.09) (1.31) (1.33) (1.30)
0.11 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.13
(1.06) (1.44) (1.52) (1.73) (1.09) (1.31) (1.32) (1.28)









Table 6: Out-of-Sample Alphas and Information Ratios, Portfolio Comparison 
 
The table reports out-of-sample portfolio alphas and information ratios of portfolios formed on 
the basis of in-sample matching regression alphas for each model (column). Portfolios of hedge 
funds are formed on January 1, 2005, and rebalanced annually on updated in-sample alphas. 
Panel A reports risk-adjusted alphas of top (bottom) decile portfolios formed on the basis of in-
sample alphas for each model. Panel B reports risk-adjusted alphas of top (bottom) quintile 
portfolios formed on the basis of in-sample alphas for each model. Panels C and D report 
information ratios for top (bottom) deciles and quintiles portfolios respectively. Significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A - Out-of-Sample Portfolio Alpha, Deciles
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
0.49* 0.33 0.37 0.23 0.39* 0.40* 0.51* 0.58***
(1.86) (1.31) (1.57) (1.09) (1.88) (1.66) (1.84) (3.3)
0.50* 0.34 0.39* 0.24 0.40* 0.40* 0.52* 0.58***
(1.95) (1.42) (1.68) (1.16) (1.92) (1.69) (1.89) (3.33)
0.48* 0.33 0.37* 0.22 0.39* 0.39* 0.51* 0.58***
(1.95) (1.4) (1.66) (1.12) (1.89) (1.67) (1.87) (3.31)
0.44* 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.38* 0.46** 0.55* 0.51***
(1.79) (1.18) (1.24) (1.23) (1.76) (1.96) (1.95) (2.96)
0.33* 0.22 0.29 0.13 0.39** 0.35* 0.41 0.49***
(1.67) (1.06) (1.45) (0.69) (2.2) (1.67) (1.56) (3.38)
0.37** 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.40** 0.42** 0.46* 0.49***
(2.14) (1.45) (1.53) (1.3) (2.24) (2.18) (1.84) (4.02)
0.32* 0.20 0.25 0.18 0.38** 0.40** 0.49** 0.51***
(1.94) (1.18) (1.57) (1.15) (2.34) (2.18) (2.37) (4.23)
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
0.06 0.25 0.35 0.50* 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.31
(0.25) (0.94) (1.24) (1.79) (0.52) (1.33) (0.86) (1.01)
0.06 0.26 0.35 0.50* 0.12 0.33 0.20 0.32
(0.26) (0.95) (1.25) (1.78) (0.53) (1.33) (0.86) (1.03)
0.08 0.27 0.36 0.51* 0.13 0.34 0.21 0.33
(0.31) (1) (1.28) (1.83) (0.58) (1.37) (0.9) (1.06)
-0.05 0.14 0.27 0.39 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.26
(-0.17) (0.45) (0.82) (1.19) (-0.01) (0.49) (0.32) (0.73)
-0.01 0.10 0.21 0.34 -0.06 0.11 0.07 0.19
(-0.06) (0.4) (0.76) (1.34) (-0.27) (0.55) (0.34) (0.67)
-0.10 0.02 0.14 0.25 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.13
(-0.4) (0.06) (0.51) (0.92) (-0.54) (-0.1) (-0.08) (0.4)
-0.32 -0.12 -0.08 0.08 -0.28 -0.09 -0.24 -0.25



























Panel B - Out-of-Sample Portfolio Alpha, Quintiles
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
0.40* 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.30* 0.31 0.34 0.39***
(1.84) (1.32) (1.47) (0.67) (1.67) (1.64) (1.54) (2.6)
0.41* 0.28 0.30 0.14 0.31* 0.32* 0.35 0.39***
(1.92) (1.43) (1.58) (0.76) (1.74) (1.68) (1.62) (2.69)
0.40* 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.30* 0.31* 0.34 0.38***
(1.9) (1.39) (1.55) (0.72) (1.71) (1.66) (1.6) (2.66)
0.34 0.20 0.21 0.08 0.25 0.33* 0.32 0.30**
(1.62) (0.95) (1.01) (0.41) (1.37) (1.77) (1.44) (2.11)
0.27 0.17 0.20 0.02 0.26* 0.25 0.22 0.30**
(1.61) (0.97) (1.21) (0.1) (1.72) (1.57) (1.14) (2.56)
0.28* 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.25* 0.28* 0.24 0.29***
(1.82) (1.06) (1.12) (0.32) (1.67) (1.88) (1.28) (2.83)
0.25* 0.18 0.19 0.07 0.25* 0.26* 0.30* 0.36***
(1.82) (1.29) (1.40) (0.44) (1.86) (1.84) (1.76) (3.42)
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
0.16 0.29 0.32 0.41* 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.27
(0.78) (1.32) (1.39) (1.81) (0.85) (1.21) (1.28) (1.09)
0.16 0.29 0.32 0.41* 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.28
(0.8) (1.33) (1.4) (1.81) (0.87) (1.24) (1.28) (1.13)
0.17 0.30 0.32 0.42* 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.28
(0.85) (1.37) (1.42) (1.84) (0.91) (1.26) (1.31) (1.15)
0.03 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.20
(0.15) (0.72) (0.92) (1.15) (0.32) (0.45) (0.64) (0.75)
0.05 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.16
(0.26) (0.72) (0.78) (1.34) (0.05) (0.44) (0.74) (0.74)
-0.03 0.07 0.12 0.18 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.11
(-0.17) (0.34) (0.53) (0.87) (-0.2) (-0.08) (0.32) (0.46)
-0.17 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.15 -0.12



























Panel C - Out-of-Sample Portfolio Information Ratio, Deciles
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
CAPM IR 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.34
FF3 IR 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.34
Carhart4 IR 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.34
AN6 IR 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.30
FH8 IR 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.08 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.38
12-Factor IR 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.42
Max R
2
 IR 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.46
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
CAPM IR 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.10
FF3 IR 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.10
Carhart4 IR 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.11
AN6 IR -0.02 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.08
FH8 IR -0.01 0.05 0.10 0.17 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.08
12-Factor IR -0.06 0.01 0.07 0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.05
Max R
2
 IR -0.18 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.18 -0.06 -0.15 -0.11
Panel D - Out-of-Sample Portfolios Information Ratio, Quintiles
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
CAPM IR 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.27
FF3 IR 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.28
Carhart4 IR 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.27
AN6 IR 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.22
FH8 IR 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.29
12-Factor IR 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.31
Max R
2
 IR 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.40
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
CAPM IR 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.11
FF3 IR 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.11
Carhart4 IR 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.11
AN6 IR 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08
FH8 IR 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.09
12-Factor IR -0.02 0.05 0.07 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.06
Max R
2







Table 7: Out-of-Sample Mutually Exclusive Portfolios 
 
The table reports annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performance measures, including 
alphas and information ratios, of mutually exclusive portfolios. For example, “DLM Ex CAPM” 
portfolio includes hedge funds in the top DLM alpha portfolio but not in the top CAPM alpha 
portfolio. “CAPM Ex DLM” portfolio includes hedge funds in the top CAPM alpha portfolio but 
not in the top DLM alpha portfolio. Portfolios of hedge funds are formed on January 1, 2005, and 
rebalanced annually on updated in-sample alphas. End values are as of December 31, 2012. 
Panel A includes top (bottom) decile mutually exclusive portfolios. Panel B includes top 
(bottom) quintile mutually exclusive portfolios. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 













































End  Value 1.89 1.62 2.18 1.41 2.27 1.61 2.27 1.63 2.32 2.00
0.54** 0.46 0.70*** 0.30 0.75*** 0.40 0.74*** 0.41 0.76*** 0.63*
(2.39) (1.01) (2.87) (0.71) (2.72) (1.22) (3.16) (1.29) (3.22) (1.90)
0.25** 0.10 0.29*** 0.07 0.28*** 0.12 0.32*** 0.13 0.33*** 0.19*
(2.37) (1.0) (2.82) (0.71) (2.66) (1.21) (3.08) (1.27) (3.12) (1.88)
Attrition Rate 8.10% 5.74% 7.19% 7.68% 7.81% 8.35% 7.19% 11.56% 7.73% 11.25%
0.42*** 0.24 0.57*** 0.09 0.60*** 0.27 0.61*** 0.29 0.64*** 0.51*
(2.66) (0.69) (3.37) (0.28) (3.27) (0.98) (3.85) (1.04) (3.77) (1.72)
0.42*** 0.23 0.56*** 0.09 0.59*** 0.27 0.61*** 0.28 0.64*** 0.51*
(2.65) (0.71) (3.33) (0.31) (3.3) (1.01) (3.9) (1.04) (3.8) (1.76)
0.33** -0.01 0.45*** -0.04 0.44*** 0.30 0.49*** 0.23 0.51*** 0.36
(2.1) (-0.03) (2.78) (-0.17) (3.14) (1.27) (3.73) (0.95) (3.51) (1.31)
0.30** 0.07 0.41*** -0.02 0.41*** 0.30 0.45*** 0.31 0.45*** 0.38
(2.25) (0.29) (3.18) (-0.08) (3.5) (1.1) (4.09) (1.29) (3.83) (1.34)
0.47*** -0.04 0.53*** -0.07 0.48*** 0.30 0.55*** 0.25 0.49*** 0.50**
(3.88) (-0.18) (3.68) (-0.34) (3.88) (1.35) (5.11) (1.13) (3.7) (2.16)
CAPM IR 0.28 0.07 0.35 0.03 0.34 0.10 0.40 0.11 0.39 0.18
Carhart4 IR 0.28 0.07 0.35 0.03 0.33 0.10 0.40 0.11 0.39 0.18
FH8 IR 0.25 0.00 0.31 -0.02 0.34 0.13 0.43 0.10 0.41 0.15
12-Factor IR 0.26 0.03 0.34 -0.01 0.34 0.14 0.43 0.15 0.40 0.17
Max R
2



















































End Value 1.62 1.71 1.82 1.42 1.92 1.63 1.85 1.60 1.88 1.73
0.38* 0.49 0.50** 0.28 0.57** 0.41 0.52** 0.38 0.54** 0.47
(1.85) (1.22) (2.24) (0.76) (2.24) (1.34) (2.22) (1.34) (2.42) (1.54)
0.19* 0.12 0.23** 0.08 0.23*** 0.14 0.23** 0.14 0.25** 0.16
(1.83) (1.21) (2.20) (0.76) (2.20) (1.33) (2.19) (1.33) (2.37) (1.53)
Attrition Rate 8.83% 6.84% 8.38% 8.52% 8.02% 8.81% 7.95% 11.89% 7.60% 12.61%
0.26** 0.29 0.38*** 0.09 0.42*** 0.28 0.39** 0.26 0.41*** 0.33
(2.11) (0.98) (2.61) (0.35) (2.76) (1.12) (2.57) (1.12) (2.87) (1.37)
0.26** 0.29 0.38*** 0.10 0.42*** 0.28 0.39*** 0.26 0.41*** 0.34
(2.22) (1.01) (2.64) (0.39) (2.83) (1.16) (2.7) (1.13) (2.95) (1.42)
0.15 0.06 0.26** -0.04 0.26** 0.21 0.27** 0.17 0.29*** 0.17
(1.38) (0.3) (2.22) (-0.19) (2.48) (1.02) (2.17) (0.87) (2.62) (0.81)
0.11 0.10 0.21* -0.06 0.20** 0.17 0.21** 0.19 0.25*** 0.16
(1.08) (0.47) (1.95) (-0.24) (2.07) (0.75) (1.96) (0.99) (2.59) (0.76)
0.15* 0.06 0.21** -0.08 0.25** 0.25 0.17* 0.19 0.28*** 0.23
(1.67) (0.33) (2.04) (-0.43) (2.42) (1.31) (1.76) (1.07) (2.68) (1.29)
CAPM IR 0.22 0.10 0.27 0.04 0.29 0.11 0.27 0.12 0.30 0.14
Carhart4 IR 0.23 0.10 0.27 0.04 0.29 0.12 0.28 0.11 0.30 0.14
FH8 IR 0.17 0.03 0.25 -0.02 0.28 0.11 0.26 0.09 0.31 0.09
12-Factor IR 0.14 0.06 0.23 -0.03 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.11 0.28 0.09
Max R
2













Table 8: Correlations between the Models in Alpha and Adjusted R2 Measures 
 
Panel reports Pearson correlation between alphas of different models; Panel B reports Pearson 






Panel A - Correlation of Alpha





Carhart4 0.91 0.97 1
AN6 0.71 0.76 0.77 1
FH8 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.60 1
12-Factor 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.74 0.69 1
Max R
2 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.39 0.31 0.41 1
DLM 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.60 0.67 0.47 0.17 1
Panel B - Correlation of Adj. R2





Carhart4 0.90 0.96 1
AN6 0.86 0.91 0.95 1
FH8 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.74 1
12-Factor 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.76 0.87 1
Max R
2 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.82 0.89 1
DLM 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.74 0.66 0.66 1
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Table 9: Long-Term Out-of-Sample Performance Persistence, Portfolio Comparison 
 
The table reports annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performance measures, including 
alphas and information ratios, of portfolios sorted on in-sample alphas for each model. Portfolios 
of hedge funds are formed on January 1, 2005, and rebalanced every two years on updated in-
sample alphas. End values are as of December 31, 2012. Panel A reports performance measures 
of top (bottom) decile portfolios formed on the basis of in-sample alphas for each model. Panel B 
reports performance measures of top (bottom) quintile portfolios formed on the basis of in-
sample alphas for each model. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated by *, 







Panel A - Out-of-Sample Portfolios, 2-Year Rebalancing, Top Decile
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
End Value 1.95 2.03 1.96 1.56 1.74 1.77 1.66 2.16
0.62 0.65** 0.61* 0.36 0.48 0.50 0.44 0.70**
(1.62) (1.97) (1.88) (1.21) (1.59) (1.53) (1.26) (2.57)
0.16 0.20* 0.19* 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.26**
(1.60) (1.94) (1.86) (1.21) (1.57) (1.52) (1.25) (2.52)
Attrition Rate 8.82% 9.46% 9.66% 10.37% 9.77% 11.18% 10.17% 9.61%
0.43 0.48** 0.44* 0.20 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.56***
(1.54) (2.05) (1.91) (1.0) (1.46) (1.4) (1.04) (2.8)
0.45* 0.49** 0.46** 0.21 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.57***
(1.69) (2.16) (2.04) (1.06) (1.57) (1.47) (1.1) (2.89)
0.43* 0.48** 0.45** 0.20 0.34 0.34 0.27 0.56***
(1.66) (2.13) (2.01) (1.02) (1.54) (1.44) (1.07) (2.87)
0.26 0.35 0.31 0.18 0.26 0.31 0.22 0.44**
(1.0) (1.52) (1.36) (0.88) (1.17) (1.35) (0.9) (2.04)
0.19 0.30 0.27 0.10 0.27 0.28 0.12 0.42***
(1.0) (1.64) (1.52) (0.56) (1.45) (1.26) (0.56) (2.63)
0.15 0.25 0.21 0.12 0.23 0.26 0.13 0.38**
(0.86) (1.5) (1.31) (0.74) (1.28) (1.28) (0.64) (2.35)
0.31* 0.28 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.41 0.20 0.30**
(1.75) (1.63) (0.88) (1.2) (1.11) (1.54) (1.11) (2.19)
CAPM IR 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.29
FF3 IR 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.30
Carhart4 IR 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.29
AN6 IR 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.23
FH8 IR 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.31
12-Factor IR 0.09 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.29
Max R
2



























Panel B - Out-of-Sample Portfolios, 2-Year Rebalancing, Top Quintile
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor Max R
2
DLM
End Value 1.78 1.76 1.77 1.56 1.67 1.67 1.61 1.87
0.51 0.49* 0.49* 0.35 0.43* 0.43 0.40 0.53**
(1.52) (1.7) (1.75) (1.36) (1.58) (1.52) (1.27) (2.23)
0.15 0.17* 0.18* 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.23**
(1.50) (1.68) (1.73) (1.35) (1.57) (1.51) (1.26) (2.19)
Attrition Rate 8.58% 9.52% 9.42% 10.52% 9.51% 10.77% 11.09% 9.28%
0.33 0.33* 0.34* 0.20 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.40**
(1.44) (1.76) (1.82) (1.25) (1.51) (1.46) (1.07) (2.52)
0.35 0.34* 0.35* 0.21 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.41***
(1.58) (1.87) (1.94) (1.32) (1.61) (1.53) (1.13) (2.63)
0.34 0.33* 0.34* 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.41***
(1.55) (1.84) (1.91) (1.29) (1.58) (1.51) (1.1) (2.61)
0.20 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.21 0.25 0.15 0.30*
(0.93) (1.19) (1.27) (1.02) (1.14) (1.4) (0.7) (1.84)
0.14 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.23 0.08 0.29**
(0.89) (1.39) (1.44) (1) (1.41) (1.39) (0.43) (2.36)
0.11 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.06 0.25**
(0.77) (1.16) (1.19) (0.98) (1.22) (1.4) (0.36) (2.23)
0.18 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.09 0.28**
(1.32) (0.59) (0.75) (1.2) (0.98) (1.29) (0.58) (2.42)
CAPM IR 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.26
FF3 IR 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.27
Carhart4 IR 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.27
AN6 IR 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.20
FH8 IR 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.28
12-Factor IR 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.26
Max R
2















Table 10: Out-of-Sample Comparison of Individual Beta-Weighted Matches 
 
Comparisons of out-of-sample individual matching between hedge funds and beta-weighted 
factor clones for each model are reported. We consider each individual hedge fund’s 
corresponding risk factors and weights determined through the previous two-year window 
regression and construct out-of-sample beta-weighted clones by loading the selected risk factors 
with regression determined weights. Panel A reports correlations between hedge fund returns and 
their beta-weighted clone returns based on one year out-of-sample data. Panel B reports adjusted 
R-squares from regressing out-of-sample returns of beta-weighted clones on returns of 





Panel A - Out-of-Sample Correlation
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor MaxR
2
DLM
2005 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.40
2006 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.30 0.40 0.26 0.18 0.49
2007 0.35 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.37 0.15 0.10 0.43
2008 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.45
2009 0.48 0.35 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.52
2010 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.46 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.57
2011 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.33 0.34 0.55
2012 0.49 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.50
Average 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.49
Panel B - Out-of-Sample Adj. R
2
CAPM FF3 Carhart4 AN6 FH8 12-Factor MaxR
2
DLM
2005 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.25
2006 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.29
2007 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.24
2008 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.35
2009 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.29
2010 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.39
2011 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.39
2012 0.34 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.37








III. Essay 2: Active Factor Investing: Hedge Funds vs. the Rest of Us34 
Jun Duanmu, Yongjia Li and Alexey Malakhov 
A. Abstract 
We argue that only hedge funds whose returns are driven by beta management of 
exposures to latent risk factors could be successfully replicated.  We develop a methodology for 
creating a portfolio of ETFs that replicates risk factor exposures taken by successful beta active 
cloneable hedge funds. The methodology allows any investor to access active factor strategies 
employed by hedge funds. It could be interpreted as cloning beta exposures of the best beta 
active hedge funds, delivering outstanding long-term risk-adjusted performance. The active 
factor ETF portfolio only requires annual rebalancing, and is constructed with a transparent 
algorithmic approach, which conforms to a definition of a smart beta strategy. 
JEL Classification: G11, G23 
Keywords: hedge funds, risk factor exposures, factor investing, return replication, performance 
prediction, beta active management, smart beta 
B. Introduction 
Hedge funds, which experienced tremendous growth in recent years with more than $2.82 
trillion in global investments currently under management,35 are widely criticized for their lack 
of transparency, liquidity, and hefty 2-20 fee structures. Numerous attempts at cloning hedge 
fund returns with liquid investment alternatives have been made in academic literature36 and also 
                                                     
34 We would like to thank participants in the 2015 Financial Management Association Annual 
Meeting, and seminar participants at University of Arkansas for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
35 According to Hedge Fund Research, Inc. October 20, 2014 press release. 
36 See, for example, Kat and Palaro (2005), Jaeger and Wagner (2005), Hasanhodzic and Lo 
(2007), Amenc, Gehin, Martellini, and Meyfredi (2008), Amenc, Martellini, Meyfredi, and 
Ziemann (2010), Giamouridis and Paterlini (2010), Freed and McMillan (2011), Weber and 
Peres (2013), and Duanmu, Li, and Malakhov (2016). 
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among major asset management companies.37 Ideally, hedge fund clones should alleviate all 
three major problems with hedge funds by providing transparency and liquidity at much lower 
costs. However, it is not clear that hedge fund returns can be replicated in the first place, as truly 
active proprietary fund management strategies could be beyond replication efforts.38 For 
example, the S.A.C. Capital Advisors’ strategy in trading Elan and Wyeth stocks based on 
insider tips obviously can’t be replicated with any algorithmic approach.39 But as John H. 
Cochrane observes, hedge fund returns may be predominantly driven by beta exposures to latent 
risk factors not readily discernible to average investors: 
As I look across the hedge fund universe, 90% of what I see is not “picking assets to 
exploit information not reflected in prices,” it is “taking exposure to factors that 
managers understand and can trade better than clients.” 40 
If hedge fund returns are indeed driven by alternative risk factor exposures,41 then it is 
reasonable to presume that it is possible to come up with a procedure for replicating hedge fund 
returns at a lower cost for all investors with a portfolio of alternative risk factors. The factor 
approach to hedge fund cloning is being employed by Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007), Amenc, 
Martellini, Meyfredi, and Ziemann (2010), Giamouridis and Paterlini (2010), and Weber and 
Peres (2013). There are, however, two problems with prevailing methods. First, only a limited 
                                                     
37 For example, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, Credit Suisse, Societe Generale, and 
BNP Paribus offer hedge fund clone products. 
38 Such strategies are often referred to as “pure alpha strategies”, synonymous with true 
managerial skill of hedge fund managers. 
39 This strategy is also illegal. See The Empire of Edge by P.R. Keefe in The New Yorker 
(October 13, 2014 issue). 
40 See John H. Cochrane’s “Hedge Funds” lecture notes at 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/teaching/ 
35150_advanced_investments/hedge_notes_and_questions.pdf  




number of potential risk factors42 are considered. Second, the prevailing focus is on replicating 
either all individual hedge funds or broad hedge fund indexes without regard to the fact that 
some hedge fund strategies are, in fact, non-reproducible.  
In this paper, we address the two issues above by following the methodology detailed in 
Duanmu, Li, and Malakhov (2016) (DLM thereafter). First, the DLM methodology spans the 
space of potential risk factors with all available ETFs, thus it greatly expands the coverage of 
tradable risk factors available for hedge fund replication. Second, the focus of DLM is on 
replicating cloneable hedge funds, namely, funds whose returns mostly reflect exposures to 
latent risk factors. Concentrating on cloneable hedge funds is the key to successful hedge fund 
replication, as it allows identifying a homogeneous group of hedge funds suitable for replication, 
i.e. the ones whose returns are driven by risk factor exposures.  
While the DLM methodology allows identifying and successfully cloning beta-driven 
hedge fund returns, it does not offer a great deal of insight on the overall quality of beta-driven 
fund management. On the other hand, the efficacy of beta active hedge fund management is 
quantified in Duanmu, Malakhov, and McCumber (2016) (DMM thereafter) by way of 
introducing a measure of the overall beta activity, BA. Portfolios comprised of the most beta 
active hedge funds produce outstanding long-term risk-adjusted performance, outperforming 
portfolios comprised of the most alpha active hedge funds. 
In this paper we combine approaches from DLM and DMM by focusing replication 
efforts only on portfolios of hedge funds that are cloneable and also display a high degree of 
overall beta activity, BA. The resulting high beta active clonenable hedge fund portfolios deliver 
outstanding long-term risk-adjusted performance, and their returns can be successfully replicated 
                                                     
42 The number of tradable factors varies from six in Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) to thirty in 
Weber and Peres (2013).  
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out-of-sample with ETF portfolios. Importantly, the replicating ETF portfolios deliver 
marginally better43 long-term risk-adjusted performance than the portfolios of beta active 
clonenable hedge funds. Further, the ETF portfolios only need to be rebalanced annually, and 
maintain the same portfolio composition throughout the year, minimizing the effect of trading 
costs.  
Our results are consistent with the relatively long-term nature of beta active management.  
Hedge fund managers take positions considering a wide range of possible macroeconomic 
scenarios.  Because it is impossible to precisely time when a particular macroeconomic scenario 
will unfold, managers may not profit from their positions for extended periods of time,44 which 
enable gains from efficaciously matching the risk factor exposures of hedge funds.  
We conclude that our strategy of replicating top beta active cloneable hedge funds with 
ETFs successfully captures beta exposures of risk factors that would deliver superior payoff in 
the future. Our approach provides a transparent and liquid alternative to investors who may want 
to get access to returns generated by factor risk exposures of top beta active hedge funds. 
C. Data Description 
This study utilizes hedge fund data from Bloomberg45 from 1994-2012 on 18,135 unique 
hedge funds.46 The compiled data is comprehensive with information on fund returns net of 
management and performance fees, assets under management, manager information, and fund 
                                                     
43 Although not at a statistically significant level.  
44 For example, Michael Burry’s bets against subprime mortgage backed securities taken in 2005 
were not profitable for two years until 2007 (see “The Big Short” (2010) by Michael Lewis). 
45 Bloomberg is the most common platform used by both hedge funds, who utilize news, 
analysis, research, and trading tools, and accredited investors, who use Bloomberg data to 
research hedge funds, private equity firms, and other alternative investment vehicles. Bloomberg 
aggregates data on live and dead funds inclusive of fund and parent company descriptions, 
manager and contact information, total assets under management, fees, past performance, and 
management style.  
46 We do not include funds of hedge funds in our sample. 
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characteristics for live as well as dead hedge funds that were acquired, liquidated, or simply 
ceased to report. We mitigate the effects of backfill bias by eliminating the first 24 months of 
reported returns.47 Additionally, since four years of data are required to calculate the DMM 
measure of beta activity, BA, 48 only funds with inception dates prior to 2007 are considered. 
which leaves us with 8,530 unique funds. Finally, in the sample of the 8,530 funds that remain, 
only 2,014 unique hedge funds, of which 963 are active and 1,051 are inactive, have sufficient 
longevity to enable our methodology. 
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics on fund returns, fees, investor liquidity, 
and fund longevity. The typical hedge fund has a median 1.5% management fee, a median 20% 
incentive fee on all profits over an investor’s high water mark,49 a $250,000 minimum initial 
investment, and a thirty day redemption period. Not surprisingly, active funds exhibit higher 
median monthly excess returns, larger median assets under management, and greater longevity 
compared to inactive hedge funds. Inactive funds have longer median redemption and lockup 
periods. Panels B and C of Table 1 report the distribution of characteristics and declared styles 
across hedge funds. 88% of all funds have a high water mark provision, and only 6% impose 
hurdle rates in addition to high water marks. 69% of funds are non-U.S. domiciled. The most 
common declared style is long-short equity, which accounts 28% of all funds, while capital 
structure arbitrage is the least common style, accounting for 1% of hedge funds.  
                                                     
47 The 24 month backfill correction is in line with results in Jagannathan, Malakhov, and 
Novikov (2010) and Titman and Tiu (2011) suggesting dropping the first 25 and 27 months of 
returns. 
48 See Duanmu, Malakhov, and McCumber (2016) for the details of the BA methodology. 
49 High water marks are investor relevant, that is, an investor will not be charged incentive fees 
until profits accrue over a previous high, net of flows. Thus, not all investors are charged 
incentive fees in any given year; it is partially determined by when the investor capital was 
employed by the fund manager. An investor whose fund shares are worth more this year than last 
will be charged incentive fees. An investor who suffered a loss previously will not pay incentive 
fees until previous losses are regained.  
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We obtain ETF data from Morningstar over the period 1994-2012 on 1,484 unique U.S. 
listed ETF funds. We manually check the description of each ETF, and exclude all ETFs that are 
not passively managed index tracking funds,50 as well as ETFs that track hedge fund style 
indexes; this leaves us with 1,387 unique ETFs. Additionally, we require ETFs to have at least 
24 monthly observations starting from January each year, and eliminate ETFs with missing 
information on management fees. Further, since fewer than five ETFs were available prior to 
1997, we excluded these years from the analysis.  The 1,313 unique passively managed ETFs 
over the period 1997-2012 that remain are used in the study.  
Figure 1 reports the number of ETFs available each year in our sample period. As shown, 
ETFs experienced significant growth over the sample period; from 19 ETFs in 1997 to 1,313 
ETFs in 2012. The increase in the number of ETFs available expands the investment opportunity 
set dramatically, and consequently, our hedge fund replicating process achieves more precision 
towards the later years in our sample period.  
Following the DLM methodology, we utilize two years of monthly ETF returns in order 
to identify the number of latent risk factors and ETFs that provide best proxies for latent risk 
factors.51 Figure 2 reports the actual number of ETFs used for each two year window. In the 
early years, relatively few ETFs make the replication procedure less accurate. Following DLM, 
we restrict our out-of-sample analysis to the period 2005-2012, where more than 100 ETFs per 
year are available for the replication procedure.52  
  
                                                     
50 Benchmark indexes that retained ETFs track may not be publicly available. Some funds track 
in-house indexes.  
51 See Duanmu, Li, and Malakhov (2016) for the details of the methodology used to replicate 
hedge fund returns with ETFs. 
52 Specifically, for our in-sample analysis, we employ hedge fund data going back to 1999 and 
ETF data going back to 2003. 
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D. Research Methodology 
In our study we rely on the methodology of hedge fund cloning with ETFs developed in 
DLM and on quantifying overall beta activity, BA, introduced in DMM.  
Our study relies on the methodologies for replicating hedge fund returns with ETFs 
detailed in DLM and for quantifying beta activity in DMM.  First, we use monthly returns over 
two-year estimation periods to construct a smart beta ETF portfolio, rebalanced on January 1 of 
each year, that replicates each hedge fund.  A measure of beta activity, BA, for each hedge fund 
is also computed on January 1 of each year in the 2005 to 2012 sample period.  Second, we rank 
all the hedge funds according to their in-sample R2 and beta activity values.  Following DLM, 
hedge funds in the top R2 quartile (tercile) of in-sample matching regressions of hedge fund 
returns on ETFs are defined as cloneable; hedge funds in the bottom in-sample R2 quartile 
(tercile) are defined as non-cloneable.  
Our analysis relies on out-of-sample portfolio tests for the following reasons. First, the 
portfolio approach allows for out-of-sample risk-adjusted performance evaluation of hedge funds 
and their replicating ETF portfolios over long periods of time. Second, it allows us to explore the 
impact of hedge fund survivorship bias on replicating ETF portfolios by either immediately 
rebalancing an ETF clone portfolio after a matched hedge fund disappears from the database, or 
leaving the ETF clone portfolio unchanged until January 1 of the next year.  
Portfolios of cloneable and beta active hedge funds as well as their replicating smart beta 
ETF portfolios are initially formed on January 1, 2005 and rebalanced on January 1 of each 
subsequent year based on the results from re-estimations of replicating ETF regressions. The 
same dollar amount is invested in each hedge fund with each annual rebalancing, and returns net-
of-fees are computed each month until the sample period ends on December 31, 2012.  When a 
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hedge fund disappears, the remaining capital is redistributed equally among the surviving hedge 
funds in the portfolio.  Moreover, when a hedge fund disappears, adjustments to the replicating 
ETF portfolio are made in one of two ways.  In a ‘matched’ clone ETF portfolio, investments in 
the replicating ETFs are liquidated and redistributed among the surviving ETFs.  In a ‘static’ 
clone ETF portfolio, no changes are made until the end of the year.  
Over our sample period, the above procedure produces a time series of 96 monthly 
returns for hedge fund and replicating ETF portfolios, which is then used to evaluate long-term 
portfolio performance across diverse economic conditions including the most recent financial 
crisis of 2008 - 2009. We calculate end dollar values based upon a $1 initial investment, mean 
excess monthly returns, Sharpe ratios, Fung and Hsieh (2004) alphas, 53 information ratios, and 
attrition rates for each time series of monthly portfolio returns from January 2005 until 
December 2012.  
E. Empirical Results  
1. Hedge Funds and Smart Beta ETF Portfolios 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the performance over the period 2005 to 2012 of cloneable 
hedge funds, namely, funds in the top in-sample R2 quartile of in-sample regressions of hedge 
fund returns on ETFs, compared to their replicating smart beta ETF portfolio.  Panel B of Table 
2 reports the performance over the period 2005 to 2012 of top beta active hedge funds, namely 
funds that rank in the top quartile of beta activity defined by DMM, compared to their replicating 
smart beta ETF portfolio.  The results confirm the overall efficacy of the DLM methodology in 
constructing replicating smart beta ETF portfolios whose returns are not statistically significantly 
different from the returns on their associated beta active hedge fund portfolios. 
                                                     
53 See DLM for details on Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha calculation. 
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2. Beta Active Cloneable Hedge Funds and Smart Beta ETF Portfolios 
While the DLM cloning methodology works very well for the portfolio of cloneable 
hedge funds, these might not be the funds whose risk-adjusted performance is desirable for most 
investors. On the other hand, given the results Panel B of Table 2, cloning the risk-adjusted 
performance of top beta active hedge funds seems like a more desirable objective.  
Now consider hedge funds that are both beta active and cloneable, namely, funds that 
rank in the top quartile of beta activity defined by DMM that are also in the top in-sample R2 
quartile of regressions of hedge fund returns on ETFs.  In other words, we now consider a 
portfolio that is an intersection of the cloneable and the top BA portfolios. Following the 
methodology described in section 3, we consider two approaches to maintain clone ETF 
portfolios following a hedge fund dropping out of the database. In a ‘matched’ clone portfolio, 
the ETF clone is liquidated and its capital is redistributed equally among remaining ETF clones 
in the clone portfolio. In a ‘static’ clone portfolio, no changes are made until the end of the year. 
The ‘static’ clone portfolio approach could be more desirable from the investor perspective, as it 
does not require monthly tracking of hedge funds and potential portfolio rebalancing, only 
relying on annual hedge fund beta exposures.54  
The results for top quartile beta active hedge funds that also belong to top quartile 
cloneable funds are presented in Table 3. Both ‘matched’ and ‘static’ clone ETF portfolios yield 
slightly higher absolute and risk-adjusted performance compared to the portfolio of beta active 
cloneable hedge funds. Moreover, the ‘static’ clone ETF portfolio produces slightly higher risk-
adjusted performance compared to the ‘matched’ clone ETF portfolio. Figure 3 compares 
                                                     
54 In fact, with the static clone portfolio approach, it suffices to only check the hedge fund data 
once a year prior to annual portfolio rebalancing. 
57 
 
cumulative performance of the portfolio of top beta active cloneable funds vs. its ‘static’ ETF 
clone portfolio. 
As a robustness check, and also to increase the number of funds in the hedge fund 
portfolio, we considered an alternative specification of cloneable hedge funds, as the top tercile 
of in-sample R2 matches. The results are presented in Table 4, and are consistent with results in 
Table 3. Despite the increased number of hedge funds, the smart beta ETF clone portfolios 
perform as well as the hedge fund portfolios; with the ‘static’ clone portfolio delivering slightly 
better risk-adjusted performance than the ‘matched’ clone portfolio.   
We summarize our findings in Table 5 along with the benchmark comparison against a 
portfolio of Bloomberg peers, i.e. all hedge funds from our data that have long enough history to 
be included in our analysis.55 All our hedge fund and smart beta ETF clone portfolios outperform 
the portfolio of Bloomberg peer hedge funds across all absolute and risk-adjusted performance 
measures. Figure 4 shows performance comparison of the ‘static’ ETF clone portfolio against 
Bloomberg peers, as well as the S&P 500 index, and also the Credit Suisse and HFR hedge 
indexes. 
3. Smart Beta ETF Portfolio Weights 
As we noted in the introduction, the underlying investment strategies of beta active hedge 
funds are reflected in their risk factor loadings. The success of such strategies depends on 
specific macroeconomic scenarios that may take time to unfold.  Since our ETF cloning 
algorithm replicates beta exposures of the best beta active hedge funds as a group, high weights 
in smart beta ETF clone portfolios indicate specific risk factors that will be most profitable in the 
future as macroeconomic conditions change.  
                                                     
55 In the DMM methodology, it is necessary for a hedge fund to have at least four years of history 
in order to calculate its measure of beta activity, BA. 
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With a benefit of hindsight we now examine the dynamics of ETF clone factor loadings 
across our sample period. Table 6 presents the top ten ETFs and their weights together with 
cumulative total, long, and short exposures of the smart beta ETF clone portfolios over the 
period 2005 to 2012. The results are very intuitive. Top beta active hedge funds scaled down 
their aggregate risk exposure as early as 2006, moving into pronounced defensive positions in 
2007 marked by a long exposure to gold (GLD), a cumulative short exposure of -0.45, and an all-
time low total aggregate exposure of 0.34. Interestingly, the top exposure in January 2011 was to 
ProShares Short S&P500 ETF (SH), which was prescient since the S&P 500 index declined in 
2011. This shows a great deal of foresight on behalf of top beta active hedge fund managers. 
F. Conclusion 
By combining the methodologies developed in DLM and DMM we develop an algorithm 
for creating smart beta ETF portfolios that replicate the risk factor exposures taken by the best 
beta active hedge funds. The resulting smart beta ETF portfolios either match or exceed the risk-
adjusted performance of their corresponding portfolios of hedge funds. Most important, the smart 
beta ETF portfolios only rely on annual rebalancing, and are constructed with a transparent 
approach.56 
  
                                                     
56 See “smart beta” definition on the Research Affiliates web site at 
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Figure 1: Number of ETFs Available, 1999-2012  
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Figure 2: Number of ETFs Used 
 














Figure 3: Beta Active Cloneable Hedge Fund Portfolio vs. Static ETF Clone Portfolio 
 
Cumulative performance of the top beta active cloneable hedge fund portfolio vs. its ‘static’ ETF 
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Figure 4: Performance Comparison 
 
Static ETF clone portfolio performance comparison against Credit Suisse Hedge Index, HFRI, 













Static ETF Clone Portfolio vs. Credit Suisse, HFR, Bloomberg Peers 
Hedge Fund Indexes, and S&P 500




Static ETF Clone Portfolio           0.23
Credit Suisse Hedge Index          0.18 
HFRI                                                0.14
Bloomberg Peers               0.15
S&P 500                                         0.07
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Summary statistics of all hedge funds 1994-2012. Panel A reports returns, fees, investor liquidity 
measures, and fund longevity. Panel B reports means of indicator variables for fund 





Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct Std
Monthly excess return 0.70 0.58 -4.38 5.95 5.46
Assets ($M) 279.39 34.63 2.50 394.50 2,365.85
Min Invest ($M) 1.08 0.25 0.02 1 12.50
Mgmt Fee (%) 1.47 1.5 0.75 2 0.76
Perf Fee (%) 17.48 20 5 20 6.75
Hurdle Rate (%) 0.37 0 0 0 1.73
Lockup Period (days) 79.80 0 0 360 189.20
Redemption Notice (days) 6.84 0 0 30 17.92
Redemption Period (days) 62.66 30 30 90 65.09
Total Redemption (days) 69.76 40 30 120 68.74
Longevity (months) 146.27 139 102 206 38.42
Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct Std
Monthly excess return 0.85 0.68 -4.72 6.58 5.81
Assets ($M) 359.24 51.80 3.92 634.00 2,454.73
Min Invest ($M) 0.60 0.25 0.02 1 1.91
Mgmt Fee (%) 1.44 1.5 0.8 2 0.71
Perf Fee (%) 17.55 20 7.5 20 6.55
Hurdle Rate (%) 0.41 0 0 0 1.74
Lockup Period (days) 66.53 0 0 360 176.17
Redemption Notice (days) 9.74 0 0 30 20.74
Redemption Period (days) 56.57 30 15 90 55.58
Total Redemption (days) 66.37 40 15 120 61.21
Longevity (months) 153.11 144 103 227 42.02
Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct Std
Monthly excess return 0.58 0.51 -4.11 5.44 5.15
Assets ($M) 187.82 24.55 1.29 247.94 2,256.17
Min Invest ($M) 1.63 0.25 0.015 1 18.23
Mgmt Fee (%) 1.50 1.5 0.75 2 0.82
Perf Fee (%) 17.39 20 4 20 6.98
Hurdle Rate (%) 0.33 0 0 0 1.71
Lockup Period (days) 96.23 0 0 360 203.00
Redemption Notice (days) 3.48 0 0 0 13.17
Redemption Period (days) 70.23 30 30 90 74.56
Total Redemption (days) 73.98 40 30 120 76.88
Longevity (months) 139.48 132 102 191 33.11
Inactive Funds (1,051 unique funds)
Active Funds (963 unique funds)
Full Sample (2,014 unique funds)
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High Water Mark 0.88 0.87 0.89
Hurdle Rate 0.06 0.07 0.04
Offshore (non-US) 0.69 0.65 0.73
Closed to New Inv 0.07 0.07 0.07
Liquidated 0.19 0.00 0.37
Acquired 0.02 0.00 0.03






Long Short Equity 0.28 0.34 0.22
Managed Futures 0.14 0.18 0.10
Multi-Style 0.11 0.09 0.13
Macro 0.09 0.08 0.11
Undisclosed 0.08 0.01 0.16
Equity Fundamental Neutral 0.06 0.05 0.07
Long Bias Equity 0.06 0.06 0.05
Emerging Markets 0.05 0.07 0.04
Distressed Securities 0.04 0.02 0.05
Merger Arbitrage 0.02 0.03 0.02
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.02 0.03 0.02
Convertible Arbitrage 0.02 0.01 0.03
Fixed Income 0.02 0.02 0.02
Equity Statistical Arbitrage 0.01 0.01 0.02





Table 2: Cloneable vs. Beta Active Hedge Funds and their Smart Beta ETFs  
 
Annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performances of portfolios formed on the basis of in-sample LASSO matching regression 
R2 or BA (Beta Activity measure, proposed by DMM). Portfolios of hedge funds and clones are formed on January 1, 2005, and 
rebalanced annually for funds in the top quartile of in-sample R2 or BA. End value is as of December 31, 2012.  Attrition rate is the 
average annual rate at which hedge funds disappear from the database; resultant capital is assumed to be equally invested in remaining 
portfolio hedge funds.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 


























2005 0.83 11.86 135 127 12.42 135 127 0.55 8.30 135 125 10.07 135 125
2006 0.83 16.17 180 164 19.36 180 164 0.48 13.05 180 171 17.11 180 171
2007 0.83 17.52 219 202 14.76 219 202 0.37 13.34 219 195 9.11 219 195
2008 0.86 -27.13 260 216 -26.88 260 216 0.46 -3.71 260 204 -6.68 260 204
2009 0.93 41.03 264 225 31.92 264 225 0.66 31.75 264 222 20.12 264 222
2010 0.89 11.83 286 257 18.29 286 257 0.53 10.81 286 229 6.72 286 229
2011 0.92 -9.73 278 233 -7.60 278 233 0.49 -7.32 278 235 -1.30 278 235
2012 0.85 9.55 246 220 13.07 246 220 0.54 2.74 246 222 8.52 246 222
End Value 1.74 1.84 1.86 1.80
Mean Return 0.51 0.59 0.53** 0.50**
(t-stat) (1.28) (1.29) (2.16) (2.14)
Sharpe Ratio 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.22
α 0.06 0.10 0.35** 0.22
(t-stat) (0.43) (0.65) (2.20) (1.47)




Cloneable Hedge Funds, Top Quartile of In-Sample R
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Table 3: Comparisons of the Top Beta Active Cloneable Hedge Fund Portfolio and its 
Matched and Static Clone Portfolios, Quartiles 
 
Annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performances of portfolios formed on the basis of 
in-sample LASSO matching regression R2 and BA (Beta Activity measure, proposed by DMM). 
Portfolios of hedge funds and clones are formed on January 1, 2005, and rebalanced annually to 
include funds that belong to top quartiles of both in-sample R2 and BA. End value is as of 
December 31, 2012.  Attrition rate is the average annual rate at which hedge funds disappear 
from the database; resultant capital is assumed to be equally invested in remaining portfolio 
hedge funds. In the matched clone portfolio, the ETF clone matched to the disappeared hedge 
fund is liquidated and its capital is redistributed equally among remaining ETF clones in the 
clone portfolio. In the static clone portfolio no changes are made throughout the year until the 
complete rebalancing next January. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated 
























2005 0.84 10.07 43 42 11.67 43 42 11.68 43 43
2006 0.81 17.08 28 28 19.72 28 28 19.72 28 28
2007 0.81 34.74 10 10 21.22 10 10 21.22 10 10
2008 0.89 -9.07 28 19 -2.26 28 19 -0.95 28 28
2009 0.93 55.04 73 64 33.93 73 64 31.55 73 73
2010 0.89 9.32 44 39 16.36 44 39 15.05 44 44
2011 0.91 -11.79 16 14 -6.07 16 14 -4.71 16 16
2012 0.86 9.19 57 54 11.95 57 54 11.71 57 57
End Value 2.58 2.60 2.59
Mean Return 0.93** 0.94** 0.93**
(t-stat) (2.23) (2.16) (2.23)
Sharpe Ratio 0.23 0.22 0.23
α 0.40 0.45* 0.46*
(t-stat) (1.58) (1.67) (1.72)
Info Ratio 0.18 0.21 0.22
Mean R
2 0.87 - -
Attrition rate 9.49% 9.49% -
Static Clone PortfolioHedge Fund Portfolio Matched Clone Portfolio
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Table 4: Comparisons of the Top Beta Active Cloneable Hedge Fund Portfolio and its 
Matched and Static Clone Portfolios, Terciles 
 
Annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performances of portfolios formed on the basis of 
in-sample LASSO matching regression R2 and BA (Beta Activity measure, proposed by DMM). 
Portfolios of hedge funds and clones are formed on January 1, 2005, and rebalanced annually to 
include funds that belong to top terciles of both in-sample R2 and BA. End value is as of 
December 31, 2012.  Attrition rate is the average annual rate at which hedge funds disappear 
from the database; resultant capital is assumed to be equally invested in remaining portfolio 
hedge funds. In the matched clone portfolio, the ETF clone matched to the disappeared hedge 
fund is liquidated and its capital is redistributed equally among remaining ETF clones in the 
clone portfolio. In the static clone portfolio no changes are made throughout the year until the 
complete rebalancing next January. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated 





























2005 0.81 9.50 55 52 11.84 55 52 11.87 55 55
2006 0.78 17.82 38 38 20.71 38 38 20.71 38 38
2007 0.76 24.18 17 15 16.32 17 15 15.63 17 17
2008 0.85 -12.17 39 27 -6.63 39 27 -5.68 39 39
2009 0.91 52.92 96 84 36.52 96 84 34.00 96 96
2010 0.86 9.67 66 56 15.09 66 56 14.02 66 66
2011 0.86 -9.11 32 27 -2.91 32 27 -1.62 32 32
2012 0.83 9.22 76 73 11.86 76 73 11.67 76 76
End Value 2.34 2.50 2.47
Mean Return 0.82** 0.89** 0.88**
(t-stat) (2.13) (2.18) (2.22)
Sharpe Ratio 0.22 0.22 0.23
α 0.32 0.43* 0.43*
(t-stat) (1.49) (1.79) (1.82)
Info Ratio 0.17 0.23 0.23
Mean R
2 0.83 - -
Attrition rate 11.90% 11.90% -
Hedge Fund Portfolio Matched Clone Portfolio Static Clone Portfolio
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Table 5: Summarized Comparisons of Bloomberg Peers Portfolio, Top Beta Active 
Cloneable Hedge Fund Portfolio, and its Matched and Static Clone Portfolios 
 
Annual returns and cumulative risk-adjusted performances of portfolios formed on the basis of 
in-sample LASSO matching regression R2 and BA (Beta Activity measure, proposed by DMM). 
Portfolios of hedge funds and clones are formed on January 1, 2005, and rebalanced annually to 
include funds that belong to the top of both in-sample R2 and BA rankings. End value is as of 
December 31, 2012.  Attrition rate is the average annual rate at which hedge funds disappear 
from the database; resultant capital is assumed to be equally invested in remaining portfolio 
hedge funds.  In the matched clone portfolio, the ETF clone matched to the disappeared hedge 
fund is liquidated and its capital is redistributed equally among remaining ETF clones in the 
clone portfolio. In the static clone portfolio no changes are made throughout the year until the 
complete rebalancing next January. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated 

























































Table 6: Ten ETFs with Highest Weights in the ETF Clone Portfolio 
 
List of ten ETFs with highest weights used to construct the clone portfolio for each vintage. ETF tickers and the corresponding 
portfolio weights are reported. Aggregate Positive Weight is the sum of betas of ETFs with positive weights selected for portfolio 
construction. Negative Aggregate Weight is the aggregation of ETF betas with negative weights. Total Portfolio Weight is the sum of 














MDY IWW VTI IGM IBB IVV IYE ITF VXF IJR
0.093 0.084 0.073 0.062 0.058 0.054 0.048 0.041 0.040 0.035
IEV IBB IXP EWU IWD XLV EWO AGG RSP EWK
0.265 0.084 0.068 0.048 0.041 0.037 0.035 0.031 0.029 0.023
GLD VDE ADRU EWC EWO IYH IGE EWA EWZ SPY
0.115 0.072 0.070 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.063 0.062 0.060 0.037
FXE IYJ IWS IAU EPP TIP VDC EWM VGT EWU
0.760 0.031 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.006
FXE RSP DWM RGI GSP DXJ RYE AGG IWP JPP
0.328 0.095 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.042 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.034
VTI TOK GBF BWX SDS DWM INY GML GBB GMM
0.157 0.112 0.108 0.084 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.037 0.036
SH IEV JYN IWR JPP ACWI RYE GMM IFNA FXO
0.242 0.164 0.150 0.147 0.141 0.109 0.088 0.049 0.049 0.048
ACWI DWM ITR XLE DLN RSP HGI GLD IGE EEM



























IV. Essay 3: On the Market Timing and Feedback Effect of “Hedging”: Evidence from U.S. 
Oil and Gas Producers57 
Yongjia Li and Kangzhen Xie 
A. Abstract 
Using a hand-collected data, we provide evidence that U.S. oil and gas producers 
generate profits on average from their use of derivatives in hedging, indicating that it is a 
positive NPV project. The profits are positively related to the intensity of hedging. Further 
decomposition shows that the profits are strongly and positively related to the market timing 
component in hedging. The hedging profits reveal some feedback effects on the hedge ratio in 
the subsequent period. Losers hedge more when they lose more. Winners hedge more when they 
gain more, but the effect is less strong. 
JEL Classification: G32, G11, G14 
Keywords: risk management, hedging, derivative, market timing, feedback effect 
B. Introduction 
Corporate risk management is an important part of corporate finance. With the growing 
popularity of financial derivatives on the markets, firms are increasing their use of financial 
derivatives for hedging. While many studies have focused on whether hedging affects 
shareholder value and why firm hedge 58, we know little about the actual impact of hedging on 
                                                     
57 We thank Han-Sheng Chen for FMA discussion, Oliver Entrop for SFA discussion, Mark 
Walker for EFA discussion, Leonard Lundstrum for MFA discussion and helpful comments from 
seminar participants at the University of Arkansas and Oklahoma State University. We also 
thank Tim Krehbiel, Wayne Lee, Pu Liu, Alexey Malakhov, Ron Miller, John Polonchek, 
Ramesh Rao, Craig Rennie, Shu Yan, Tim Yeager and Jun Zhang, for suggestions that improved 
the paper. We thank John Hill, Liu Hong, Cheng Li, Jinqiu Yan and Wei Yang for the excellent 
research assistance. 
58 The literature has proposed several channels for hedging to affect shareholder value including 
reducing cost of financial distress (e.g., Stulz (1984)), tax saving (e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985), 




the corporate earnings due to the lack of data. A related and widely debated issue is whether 
firms should take a view on the timing of their use of derivatives in hedging and its consequence 
(e.g., Stulz (1996), Faulkender (2005), Adam and Fernando (2006), Brown et al. (2006), Geczy 
et al. (2007), Chernenko and Faulkender (2011))59. Also, an unexplored issue is whether and how 
the results of hedging affect subsequent hedging decisions. Drawing on a hand-collected data, we 
are able to provide new insights into these issues.  
Recent accounting rules allow us to take a closer look at the consequence of corporate 
hedging. FASB 133 requires firms to disclose the details of their hedging activities. FASB 161 
further requires firms to disclose the purpose of using derivatives and the outcome. We focus on 
the U.S. oil and gas producers in the sample period from 2007 to 201160 and hand-collect the 
gains and losses from the use of derivatives for risk management. Firms can choose to record the 
hedging activities and profits on hedge account and/or non-hedge account. While most users of 
non-hedge account claim that their derivatives positions are for hedging, the fact that they elect 
to use non-hedge account indicates that their derivative transactions don’t fully match the real 
production. The deviation from pure hedging makes it harder to comply with the requirement of 
hedge accounting.61  We use the information in the two accounts to further identify the effects of 
hedging.  
                                                     
(1993)), and product market competition (e.g., Zhu (2011)).  Smith (2008) provides a survey on 
corporate risk management. However, the empirical evidence is mixed.  (e.g., see a review paper 
by Aretz and Bartram (2010)). Bodnar et al (2014) use survey data and find that managerial risk 
aversion plays a role in the decision to hedge.  
59 Since the literature also uses terms such as selective hedging and speculation for market timing 
hedging, we use these terms interchangeably in our paper. 
60 Although the effective date for FASB 161 is for the fiscal years beginning after Nov 15, 2008, 
most firms in our sample also reported the profits of the use of derivatives in 2007.  
61 We don’t claim that all firms use non-hedge accounting for market timing activities as 
Demarzo andDuffie (1995) suggest that the choice of hedge accounting may also be affected by 
career concern. The association between the use of non-hedge accounting and market timing 




We find that U.S. oil and gas producers on average generate profits on their use of 
derivatives for hedging during our sample period. The average hedging profit is a gain of 1.78% 
of assets, which contrasts to an average 3.48% loss of return on assets. Thus, the hedging 
outcome has a significant impact on corporate earnings. The mean and median of raw hedging 
profits are $74.9 million and $5.92 million respectively. We further investigate the outcome of 
hedging in each year in the sample. The hedging activities produce positive profits on average 
almost in every year except 2007. The mean and median of cumulative profits over the five-year 
window are $ 283.19 million and $30.18 million respectively.   The result is surprising. As we 
know that the use of derivatives is a zero-sum game, we should expect the hedgers to make zero 
profit on average. The finding indicates that the use of derivatives in hedging can be a positive 
NPV activity in oil and gas industry.  
The question then arises: are the profits driven by favorable market condition or by 
market timing? Adam and Fernando (2006) find that gold mining firms earn profit in the use of 
derivatives due to the persistent positive risk premia in the gold futures market, so could firms in 
our sample also happen to gain for the same reason? To address this issue, we follow Jin and 
Jorion (2006)’s method to calculate the hedging portfolio delta and normalize it by the total 
production to obtain Relative Delta Production as the measure for hedge ratio. Our regressions 
show that the hedging profits are positively related to the hedge ratio and the risk premia in oil 
futures contracts. We then adopt three approaches to decompose the hedging activities into two 
parts: the true hedging component and the market timing component. We first use the industry 
mean hedge ratio each year as the true hedging component and the deviation from the industry 
mean as the market timing component. We allow variation of industry mean over time to reflect 




specific hedging demand, the second approach regresses the hedge ratio on firm characteristics 
and risk premia. It then uses each firm’s predicted hedge ratio as the true hedging component and 
the residual as the market timing component. There can be unknown firm factor that causes a 
firm to hedge differently from others persistently. Hence, the third approach uses the firm fixed 
effect regression to further control the unknown factor. We find that the total profits and the 
profits recorded on non-hedge account are positively related to the market timing component in 
all three decompositions while the profits recorded on hedge account are not. Hence, the positive 
profits are likely to be generated by the market timing activities of the firms in our sample.  
To further investigate this issue, we also try to separate the market timing profits from 
hedging profits. Assuming a firm doesn’t change hedging portfolio actively, then the profits 
which the firm would obtain should be roughly equal to the hedging portfolio delta multiplied by 
the change of commodity prices during the year. The estimated profits should capture the 
outcome from true hedging component and favorable market condition. We then obtain the 
market timing profits as the difference between the actual profits and the estimated profits. Both 
the mean and median of the difference are positive and large relative to firms’ reported profits.  
We then regress the difference on the two components of hedge ratio. If the firm adjusts the 
hedging portfolio to time the market, then the difference will reflect the gains or losses generated 
from these activities. We find that the difference is positively related to the market timing 
component of hedge ratio. Thus, evidence again shows that firms are able to generate profits 
through the market timing activities.  
Lastly, we find that the hedging activities are affected by the hedging profits in the 
preceding period. A closer look reveals that the feedback has opposite effects for winners and 




there is a negative feedback effect when a firm suffers a loss from the previous hedging. It 
appears that the more the firm loses, the more it will hedge in the subsequent period. When a 
firm only uses financial derivatives to hedge and sticks to the optimal hedge ratio, the gains or 
losses of hedging should be closely related to the change of market prices in the current period 
and should not be affected by the gains or losses of preceding hedging activities. Also, the net 
income should not be impacted much by the result of hedging activities because any losses or 
gains on the revenue of production will be offset by those from the hedging positions. However, 
if a firm uses financial derivatives for market timing and deviates from the optimal hedge ratio, 
the net income will then be impacted by the outcome of the derivatives contracts. For this reason, 
the firm will adjust its derivatives positions given the result of hedging in the preceding period. 
Therefore, the current use of derivatives will vary with the consequence of previous activities. 
Our findings on feedback effect provide further evidence that firms use derivatives for 
investment and even for speculation purpose. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the findings on hedging profits 
and the positive relationship between hedging profits and hedging activities suggest that the use 
of derivatives can be a positive NPV investment. To our knowledge, our data is the first sample 
which contains the information of both hedging activities and actual hedging profits.  Allayannis 
and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2006) provide support that hedging increases shareholder 
wealth while Jin and Jorion (2006) find no evidence that hedging affects firm value in the oil and 
gas industry. Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013) also show that the use of weather derivatives in 
hedging increases the market-to-book ratios.  Several studies (e.g., Adam and Fernando (2006), 
Brown et al. (2006)) use survey data on gold mining firms to estimate the cash flow outcome of 




gas industry are based on actual accounting data instead of estimated cash flows. Campello et al. 
(2011) argue that hedging can affect corporate outcome by reducing cost of borrowing and 
alleviating capital expenditure restriction. Our analysis provides direct evidence of hedging on 
corporate earnings.  
Second, we are able to decompose the performance of hedging activities and find that the 
positive derivative outcome is associated with the market timing component of hedging. This 
finding is contrary to previous literature on hedging of interest rate risk and foreign exchange 
rate risk which states that firms (except financial firms) do not possess information advantage in 
general. Our research helps to resolve the debate on hedging and speculation (e.g., Faulkender 
(2006), Adam and Fernando (2006), Brown et al. (2006), Geczy et al. (2007), Chernenko and 
Faulkender (2011)). Stulz (1996) suggests that selective hedging can benefit firms which possess 
an information advantage relative to the market and firms which have the strength to bear 
additional risk from market timing activities. However, the previous research finds that the 
profits of selective hedging are trivial.   Oil and gas producers collect information on the demand 
and supply of commodities and make production decision based on their predictions on the 
future market prices. This information can be transferred to their risk management teams to make 
hedging decisions. Hence, our study provides evidence for the hypothesis of information 
advantage. Not all firms which use selective hedging are successful. However, our results show 
that at least some firms are able to deliver good performance on the market timing activities 
consistently.  
Third, our paper adds to the current research on learning and feedback effect in corporate 




researchers start to investigate how the market prices can affect corporate decisions62. For 
example, Luo (2005) shows that an acquisition can learn from the market’s reaction to a merger 
announcement. Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang (2013) illustrate how market anticipation and stock 
price affect the probability of a firm being a takeover target. Our paper shows that the outcome 
of hedging matters for corporate hedging activities. The changes of oil and gas prices affect 
firms’ hedging decision through the profits of hedging and the channel of firms’ earnings. The 
losers learn to hedge more when their losses are more.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data sources, 
collection methods and summary statistics; section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and 
regression results; section 4 provides results of robustness tests, and section 5 concludes the 
paper.  
C. Data and Sample Description 
We focus on all oil and gas producers with SIC code of 1311 in the United States for 
which data is available from 2007 to 2011. The initial dataset contains 1029 firm-year 
observations. We then drop 60 firm-year records with missing asset values. We further remove 
362 observations for firms whose assets are less than $100 million as small firms are often not 
required to provide disclosure on derivatives positions and don’t actively use derivatives for 
hedging due to the lack of expertise. We also require that the data on hedging contracts, hedging 
profits and financial information should be available. Our final sample for regression consists of 
105 firms and 397 firm-year observations.  
                                                     




1. Derivatives Contracts and Hedge Ratio 
In order to study firms’ use of derivatives, we hand-collect derivatives contracts from the 
annual 10-K reports. We write a PERL program to collect the entire text of 10-K for each firm 
from SEC Edgar database. Using the algorithm, we search for financial hedging keywords such 
as “hedg”, “derivative”, “financial instrument”, “risk management”, “item 7a”, “market risk”, 
“commodity risk”, “price risk”, “notional”, “commodity contract”, “commodity option”, “option 
contract”, “forwards”, “forward contract”, “forward exchange”, “oil forwards”, “natural gas 
forwards”, “futures”, “futures contract”, “commodity futures”, “oil futures”, “natural gas 
futures”, “swap”, “collar” , “fixed price” and “volumetric production”. 
We then read through surrounding texts of each highlighted keyword and manually code 
the contracts data. We collect all derivatives contracts for firms’ crude oil, natural gas and 
natural gas liquids (NGL) productions (Following Jin and Jorion (2006), NGL contracts are 
converted into standard crude oil contracts and treated as oil equivalent). The types of contracts 
include call options, put options, ceiling and floor contracts, fixed price swaps, forward and 
futures contracts, two-way collars and three-way collars. As in Jin and Jorion (2006), oil and gas 
basis contracts are not included in our data samples.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of firms’ derivatives contracts. Panel A shows 
that oil and gas related derivatives have balanced representation in our samples. The numbers 
and notional amounts of derivatives contracts in both commodities vary over years. Panel B 
summarizes the contracts for each type of derivatives. Swaps are the most popular derivative 
instruments used by oil and gas firms. Collars come next. Firms also use put options and floors 





Following Jin and Jorion (2006), we employ Black and Scholes’s derivative valuation 
model to calculate the delta for every contract. Out of our samples, there are 397 firm-years with 
delta in crude oil or gas contracts. We then aggregate individual delta to portfolio delta on the 
firm-year level and scale the firms’ portfolio delta by their reported production for the year. The 
scaled delta represents the firm’s hedge ratio in oil and gas production in that year (e.g., Tufano 
(1996), Jin and Jorion (2006)).63  




As a robustness check, each firm-year’s total notional amount of derivatives positions is 
calculated and scaled by annual production as another measure of hedge ratio. 




Panel A of Table 2 gives the summary statistics of firms’ Relative Delta Production and 
Relative Notional Production. Our regression samples include 397 observations from 2007 to 
2011. The mean and the median of hedge ratio are 84.48% and 62.57% every year.  The value of 
Relative Delta Production appears to be greater than that in Jin and Jorion (2006) whose sample 
period ranges from 1998 to 2001. We use the delta calculation example in their paper and verify 
that our procedure obtains the same number for Relative Delta Production. The calculation 
example is presented in Appendix B. The difference may be driven by two reasons.  First, firms 
in our sample are bigger. We only include firms with asset size at least $100 million while Jin 
and Jorion (2006) require asset size greater than $20 million. Large firms tend to use more 
                                                     
63 For example, a firm lists its outstanding derivatives contracts which would be in effect from 
January 2010 in the 2009’s annual report. These derivatives positions are actually scheduled to 
hedge the oil and gas production in fiscal year 2010 and forward and hence are used to calculate 




derivatives. Also, we drop firms with no use of derivatives as our major interest is to investigate 
the profits of derivative transactions. If we include those firms, then the sample mean and 
median of Relative Delta Production are 57.56% and 38.93% respectively. The results could be 
found in Appendix C. Second, Jin and Jorion (2006)’s sample period is from 1998 to 2001. Oil 
prices were much higher and more volatile during our sample period from 2007 to 2011, which 
created more incentives to use derivatives in hedging. Moreover, the new accounting rules which 
became effective in 2008 could have improved the quality of firms’ disclosure on derivative 
position. Third, we use all derivative positions including those with a maturity longer than one 
year. It is possible that firms also increase their long-term hedging given the high price and 
volatile market condition.  If we exclude those long-term contracts, the mean and median of 
Relative Delta Production are 72.69% and 46.92% respectively.  
2. Derivative Gains and Losses 
To obtain the actual gains and losses from hedging activities, we use the same PERL 
algorithm to locate gains and losses information in 10-K and manually compile them into our 
database.  
With FASB 133, firms are required to disclose the outcome of derivatives positions. If a 
firm designates the derivatives as cash flow hedges to be treated as the hedge account, then only 
realized gains or losses will impact earnings. The realized gains or losses are recorded as 
Reported Realized Hedge Profit in this paper. The unrealized gains or losses will be recorded in 
the other comprehensive income and accumulated until actualized. A firm can also elect not to 
designate its derivative instruments as cash flow hedges, but then the gains or losses are recorded 
on income statement immediately whether they are realized or unrealized. We record this type of 




them can become “ineffective” due to the change of market condition and firm’s production. The 
gains or losses of the ineffective portion of cash flow hedge will also be immediately reflected on 
earnings whether realized or unrealized and are recorded as Reported Ineffective Hedge Profit. 
The Reported Total Profit is the sum of Reported Realized Hedge Profit, Reported non-Hedge 
Profit and Reported Ineffective Hedge Profit. We hand-collect the gains and losses for the above 
items whenever they are available in 10-K files.  
Panel A of Table 2 also provides the summary statistics of firms’ derivative profits 
normalized by total assets64. Overall, our results are similar to that in Manchiraju et al. (2012). 
The U.S. oil and gas firms generate profits in the use of derivatives on average, with the average 
total profits being 1.78% of total assets and the total median profits being 0.63% of total assets. 
(The mean of total raw profit before normalized by assets is $74.9 million and the median is 
$5.92 million65). T-tests show that the mean of Reported Total Profit and all of its components 
are significantly greater than zero. The 25th percentile of Reported Total Profit is -0.62% of 
assets. While the 75th percentile is 3.76%, about seven times larger than the 25th percentile in 
absolute value. Clearly, the gains from hedging far exceed the losses.  
The finding of positive profits is surprising. According to hedging theory (e.g., Stulz 
(1984), Stulz (1990), Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot et al. (1993), Demarzo and Duffie (1995), 
Mello and Parsons (2000)), the expected return on hedging activities should be around zero since 
the use of derivatives is a zero-sum game. Further, Dewally et al. (2013) find that hedging profits 
are negative on average due to the hedging pressure and risk premia in futures contracts. 
                                                     
64 Out of the 381 observations, several firms only report “net of tax gains or losses.” We address 
the tax issue by calculating the firm-year’s corporate income tax rate and adding back the taxes 
to its gains and losses.    
65 These numbers are not obtained by multiplying the mean and median of total profit in Panel A 




However, we find that firms gain from the use of derivatives on average with substantial 
economic value, which is contrary to the prediction of hedging theories. In section III, we further 
investigate the sources of gains using regression analysis. 
3. Other Control Variables 
The control variables include those identified by the literature as being determinants of 
the hedging activities: Log Asset, Market to Book Ratio, Leverage Ratio, Cash66, Dividend, S&P 
Rating Dummy (e.g., Nance et al (1993), Haushalter (2000), Stulz (1996), Adam and Fernando 
(2006)). Besides, we include several other variables. We collect Lifting Cost per Boe (production 
cost per barrel of oil equivalent). Jin and Jorion (2006) use lifting cost as a control for Q ratio 
regression. We conjecture that the hedging demand is likely to be positively related to the lifting 
cost. The higher the lifting cost, the greater the incentive to hedge the production. Similarly, the 
Cost of Goods Sold and Inventory are used as control variables. We also include Revenue 
(revenue from oil and gas production), which is a direct measure of the demand for hedging, and 
ROA (return on assets), which measures the performance of the firm. We assume that capable 
firms are more likely to hedge. Lastly, we include the annual Oil Price Volatility, Gas Price 
Volatility, Oil Futures Risk Premia and Gas Futures Risk Premia. Since Oil Price Volatility and 
Gas Price Volatility are highly correlated, we only use Oil Price Volatility. The more volatile the 
oil (or gas) prices, the higher the demand for hedging. Also, we expect that the hedging demands 
are positively related to risk premia, which are the spreads between contracted futures prices and 
realized spot prices (e.g., Adam and Fernando (2006)).  
The data on oil and gas production and reserve, lifting cost per barrel of oil equivalent 
and total revenues from oil and gas production are collected from Bloomberg Financial Market 
                                                     




Platform. We manually check and correct the values and complement the missing values if we 
can find them from 10-Ks. Companies’ fundamental data are collected from COMPUSTAT.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the control variables included in 
regressions. We winsorize the ratio variables at the 1% level. The Oil Futures Risk Premia is 
slightly negative and Gas Futures Risk Premia is positive on average. The mean of annual Oil 
Price Volatility is 0.4153, which is high relative to the whole economy. Cash, Inventory, Cost of 
Goods Sold, ROA, Revenue and Capital Expenditure are normalized by total assets. The 
Dividend is normalized by the number of shares outstanding. 
Panel C and Panel D of Table 2 display the yearly distribution of hedge ratio and hedging 
profits variables. U.S. oil and gas producers hedge a significant amount of oil and gas production 
while the mean and median of hedge ratio vary over years. U.S. oil and gas producers 
experienced a small loss only in 2007 and made profits in all other years in our samples. Panel D 
also provides the summary of profits on hedge account and non-hedge account. Mean and 
median profits on both accounts are positive. The standard deviation of profits on the non-hedge 
account is larger (hence more volatile) than that on the hedge account, indicating that the profits 
on non-hedge account are more closely related to the market timing activities than those on 
hedge account.  
Panel E presents the yearly distribution of Oil Futures Risk Premia and Gas Futures Risk 
Premia. Since most of the hedging positions cover the productions spreading out in the year, we 
calculate the risk premia for each business day every year and then use the annual mean in the 
regressions.  The risk premia are lagged values. For example, the mean of Oil Futures Risk 
Premia in 2009 is 38.871, which means the average difference between the 1-year contracted oil 




premia to the derivative profits in 2009 and the outstanding derivative positions at the end of 
2008.  
Panel F investigates whether there are some firms which can consistently generate more 
profits on their hedging activities. If a firm can make positive profits in at least 4 years, we call it 
a Good Hedger. Otherwise, we call it a Mediocre Hedger. We find 27 firms are Good Hedgers 
with 133 firm-year observations, and 78 firms are Mediocre Hedgers with 264 firm-year 
observations. We then compare their hedge ratios and profits. The Good Hedgers are able to 
deliver three times profits as much as the Mediocre Firms do while the hedge ratios for both 
groups are not much different. The finding indicates that there are some firms which have some 
skills in their use of derivatives and the profits are likely to be related to not only how much 
firms hedge but also how firms hedge.  
Table 3 gives Pearson correlation of our key variables and control variables. Our two 
proxies for hedge ratio (Relative Delta Production and Relative Notional Production) are 
positively correlated with firms’ Leverage Ratio and negatively correlated with firms’ financial 
strength (Cash and S&P Rating Dummy). They are also positively correlated with Lag Oil Price 
Volatility. This reflects that firms hedge according to the hedging demand. However, they are 
also positively correlated to the Oil and Gas Futures Risk Premia. The three measures of hedging 
profits are highly and positively correlated to the hedge ratio. The Reported Total Profit is 
slightly positively correlated to the Oil and Gas Futures Risk Premia. However, the Reported 
Realized Hedge Profit is strongly and positively correlated with the risk premia while the 





D. Empirical Design and Results 
We focus on the U.S. oil and gas producers for several reasons: First, previous studies 
show that the industry is exposed to oil and gas price risks and uses financial derivatives to 
hedge the risks extensively. Second, the firms in this industry have their business concentrated in 
the oil and gas production and are not diversified. Therefore, we don’t need to consider the effect 
of diversification and natural hedge. Third, the products are quite homogeneous and hence are 
exposed to the same market price risks.67 
Being able to observe both the hedging activities and the actual hedging profits allows us 
to investigate two issues which intrigue both researchers and practitioners. The first issue is 
about the extent of market timing hedging (or called selective hedging) and its effectiveness. The 
second issue is the feedback effect of hedging outcome on future hedging activities. The 
following subsections discuss the empirical methods designed to address these issues and the 
empirical findings.  
1. Hedging Profits and Decomposition of Hedge Ratio 
In previous section, we show that hedging activities generate profits. However, it is not 
clear how the hedging gains are linked to hedging activities. Consequently, our first step is to 
investigate whether the positive profits are driven by hedging activities. We employ the 
following regression model.  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽×𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾×𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (1) 
where subscript i refers to the firm, subscript t refers to the time in years, ηt refers to time fixed 
effects, and µi refers to firm fixed effects. 
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In the regression model, Hedge is the measure of hedge ratio. The primary proxy for 
hedge ratio is Relative Delta Production which follows Jin and Jorion (2006) and is the portfolio 
delta in year t divided by total production for the year. In case there is measurement error in 
calculating delta, a second proxy is used: Relative Notional Production, which is the total 
notional amount of outstanding derivatives positions in year t divided by total production for the 
year. 
If firms hedge according to the exact amount and date of future production without 
market timing, then profits generated from hedging activities should be around zero since 
derivative trading is a zero-sum game, and hence we should not expect any significant 
relationship between hedge ratio and hedging profits. The coefficient 𝛽 for Hedge should not be 
significantly different from zero. However, if the oil and gas producers indeed possess superior 
information and/or skills in hedging (e.g., Stulz (1996)), firms are able to generate positive 
expected return from hedging. Then, we should observe a positive relationship between hedging 
and profits.  
One concern is that with hedge accounting the profits from a derivative position 
designated as a cash flow hedge are recognized in earnings when the transaction being hedged is 
realized, not necessary when the profits from the derivative positions are realized. If, however, 
the derivative position is classified as a fair value hedge, profits will be recognized in earnings 
when the profits occur.  Since fair value hedges are typically applied to commodity inventories 
and are rare in the energy industry, we find that almost all hedges in our sample are cash flow 
hedges. Thus, one may argue that the association between a firm’s derivatives position and 
profits from derivatives is hard to interpret due to the delay in the timing of when profits from 




Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported non-Hedge Profit separately. The results of 
Reported Non-Hedge Profit should help to reduce the timing problem.  
We include three measures of derivative profits in the regressions. As illustrated in Table 
2, we are able to obtain the total profits of derivatives and the individual profit components in 
firms’ current earnings. The Reported Total Profit is the sum of realized cash flow hedge profits, 
realized and unrealized profits from non-hedge designated derivatives and the realized and 
unrealized profits from ineffective portion of cash flow hedge. The measure Reported Realized 
Hedge Profit represents the outcome of the use of derivatives that a firm designated as hedge 
account. Generally, this item should be closely related to the true hedging activities. The third 
measure Reported non-Hedge Profit is the sum of realized and unrealized gains or losses on non-
hedge designated derivatives. Although firms typically claim that the use of derivative is for 
hedging, it is likely for firms to conduct selective hedging since this type of hedging activities 
and results are not recorded on hedge account.  
Adam and Fernando (2006) argue that a persistent upward biased risk premia in oil and 
gas futures can generate profits for short hedgers. Hence, the hedging profits may be driven by 
the positive risk premia instead of firms’ efforts in selective hedging. To account for this 
possibility, we include the annual mean oil and gas futures risk premia in regressions. If the 
hedging profits are caused by positive risk premia, then these two variables should have positive 
coefficients.  
Table 4 presents estimation results for equation (1). The dependent variable in model 1, 2 
and 3 is the Reported Total Profit on derivatives. We use the Reported Realized Hedge Profit for 
model 4, 5 and 6, and the Reported non-Hedge Profit for model 7, 8 and 9. We use Relative 




We find a positive relationship between profits and hedging activities. The regression 
coefficients in model 1, 2 and 3 are significant at the 1% level. For example, in column 1, the 
coefficient for Relative Delta Production is 0.018. A one standard deviation increase in Relative 
Delta Production would yield a 0.014 increase in Reported Total Profit on derivatives, which is 
greater than 70% of the average total profits.  
To control for unobserved market factors which might drive firms’ use of derivatives in a 
specific year, we add year fixed effects in model 2, 5 and 8. In model 3, 6, and 9, we add firm 
fixed effects in addition to year fixed effects to control for unobserved firm-level characteristics 
which may affect firms’ demand for hedging.   
The differences between the coefficients for Relative Delta Production of column 4, 5, 6 
and that of column 7, 8, 9 reveal that firms’ derivatives positions create a greater impact on non-
hedge designated profits than on hedge designated profits. The difference indicates that a 
proportion of total profits is the result of market timing activities.  
The Oil Futures Risk Premia are significant in most regressions. Consistent with the 
finding in Adam and Fernando (2006), the hedging outcome is positively related to Oil Futures 
Risk Premia. Thus a fraction of the hedging profits is likely to be driven by the risk premia in the 
futures market. The Gas Futures Risk Premia are dropped from the regressions once we include 
the year fixed effect. The Gas Futures Risk Premia appear to have a negative sign, but this is due 
to the high collinearity with Oil Futures Risk Premia.  The correlation coefficient is 0.93 in 
Table 3.  If we drop Oil Futures Risk Premia, then the sign for Gas Futures Risk Premia are all 
positive and significant. Also, if we only use Gas Futures Risk Premia in the regressions for the 




1.1 Decomposition using Industry Mean 
While the model above can help us examine the relationship between hedging and the 
outcome of hedging, another issue remains to be addressed: do profits come from true hedging 
activities or market timing activities? We adopt three approaches to decompose the hedge ratio 
and obtain the component which is likely related to market timing. 
The first approach measures the deviation of a firm’s hedge ratio from the industry’s 
average hedge ratio. Since there exist market-level factors that cause the general shift of hedging 
demand for the whole industry, the hedging profits may be positively related to the hedging 
demand driven by these factors. The industry-level hedge ratio can help absorb this effect of 
hedging. The deviation from this ratio is likely to be driven by individual firm’s own market 
timing decision in hedging. For each year, we first calculate the industry average Relative Delta 
Production. We then subtract each firm’s Relative Delta Production by industry average Relative 
Delta Production to obtain the firm’s Relative Delta Production Deviation. The deviation 
corresponds to market timing hedging activities and the industry-level hedge ratio reflects true 
hedging activities. 
Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1×𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2×𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡        (2) 
+ 𝛾×𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Similarly, we use the three measures of hedging profits in our estimation starting with the 
raw model, and then models with year fixed effects and models with both year and firm fixed 
effects. From column 1 to column 3 of Table 5, the coefficients of the deviated hedge ratio are all 




2 and 3 due to the collinearity with fixed effects. The coefficient for industry average hedge ratio 
in column 1 is positive at 0.123 and also significant at the 1% level.  
Interestingly, when using Reported Realized Hedge Profit as the dependent variable in 
column 4, 5 and 6, the market timing effects become insignificant as we expected, and the 
hedging effects become significant at the 5% level in model 4. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the industry average Relative Delta Production represents true hedging activities, 
while the deviation from industry average Relative Delta Production proxies for market timing 
activities.  
The results using Reported non-Hedge Profit provide further evidence for market timing. 
The coefficient for Delta Deviated from Mean is significant at the 1% level even after controlling 
for Industry Mean Delta. 
1.2 Decomposition using Regression Predicted Hedge and Residual 
While the deviation from industry mean hedge ratio can be a good proxy for market 
timing, it can still contain the effect driven by each firm’s own demand. Therefore, the second 
approach of decomposition uses the residual from the regression of firm’s hedge ratio on factors 
that are likely related to hedging demand. We first estimate the following model to obtain the 
residual: 
𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽×𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾×𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (3) 
Xi,t are the control variables including Lifting Cost per Boe, Market to Book Ratio, Leverage 
Ratio, Log Asset, Cash, ROA, Revenue, S&P Rating Dummy, Capital Expenditure, Dividend, Lag 
Oil Price Volatility, Oil Futures Risk Premia and Gas Futures Risk Premia. 
Because these firm-specific characteristics determine firms’ regular demand for 




Similarly, the regression residual would be the proxy for firms’ market timing activities. We then 
use these two variables as independent variables in the following regression model: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1×𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2×𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡        (4) 
+ 𝛾×𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The results are reported in Table 6. As we expected, the market timing component still 
plays an important role in determining hedging profits. For example, in column 1, the coefficient 
of residual (market timing component) is 0.024 and is significant at the 1% level. The result 
remains if we add year and firm fixed effects. The predicted value (true hedging component) also 
has a positive impact on the profits. However, once we include both of year fixed effects and 
firm fixed effects, it is no longer significant. It is possible that the firm fixed effects absorb the 
persistent profits generated by the predicted hedge ratio. 
In model 4, 5 and 6, we find that the market timing component is also positively 
significant. It indicates that firms’ profits on hedge designated derivatives positions also include 
market timing effect, even though firms assert that these derivatives positions are designed as 
cash flow hedge. 
The regressions of Reported non-Hedge Profit yield a similar picture as previous tables. 
The market timing component has a strong effect in predicting the profits even with both fixed 
effects. The true hedging component represented by predicted hedge ratio has no effect after 
controlling for the firm fixed effects. 
1.3 Decomposition using Fixed Effect Regression Predicted Hedge and Residual 
The third approach is an extension of the methods described above. We employ a stricter 
examination on the decomposition of hedge ratio. We regress firms’ Relative Delta Production 




positions as in equation (3). Importantly, we also include firm fixed effects in the regressions. 
We then obtain the regression predicted value as a proxy for true hedging component, and the 
regression residual as a proxy for market timing component. The firm fixed effects can absorb 
part of individual firm’s market timing effect if a firm conducts persistent market timing 
activities. For example, if a firm keeps more short positions each year during our sample period, 
then it will show up in the intercept of the regression and be recognized as hedging activity. 
Therefore, this is a quite stringent rule which leaves only the time varying speculation behavior 
in the residual. We use these two proxies in the regression and report the results in Table 7.  
In column 1, the coefficient of residual (market timing component) is 0.021 and is 
positively significant at the 1% level. The coefficients are also positively significant for model 2 
with year fixed effects, and model 3 with both year and firm fixed effects. Specifically, the 
coefficient of market timing component is stronger than that of true hedging component in model 
3. The coefficient of true hedging component becomes insignificant because the fixed effects in 
model 3 absorb the consistent hedging profits. When we use the Reported Realized Hedge Profit 
in model 4, 5 and 6, the coefficients of market timing component are weaker. However, the 
coefficients then get stronger for the Reported non-Hedge Profit in the regressions of 7, 8 and 9. 
Overall, with a stricter rule, the results are still in support of our finding that firms are market 
timers and achieve a large amount of derivative gains from market timing activities. 
1.4 Decomposing the Profits with Estimated Profits 
Lastly, we measure the difference between the reported profits from 10-K and an 
estimated profit and use it as a proxy for market timing profits. The estimated profit is the 
predicted year-end profit calculated by multiplying the portfolio delta of a firm’s outstanding 




and is then normalized by total assets. If a firm maintains its outstanding portfolio to the end of 
the year, then the estimated profit should be a good proxy for the natural market impact on 
hedging profits due to the change of year-end prices. We consider the difference between 
reported profits and estimated profits as the market timing profits. The mean and median of the 
market timing profits are 1.53% and 0.52% of total assets, which are large relative to the mean 
and median of total profits.  
We first use the same regression specification in equation (2) and replace the dependent 
variable with the market timing profits. The regressions outputs are provided in Table 8. Overall, 
the market timing component of hedging is strongly related to the market timing profits. In 
model 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9, the coefficients of residual (market timing component) are significant at 
the 1% level. In regard to profits designated as hedge, the coefficients of market timing 
component are still significant in model 4, 5 and 6. 
We then use the market timing profits as the dependent variable in equation (4) and the 
independent variables remain the same. The regressions outputs are in Table 9. The market 
timing component of hedging is consistently significant in model 3 and 9 with both year and firm 
fixed effects. Hence, the market timing activities generate profits for the firms. Interestingly, the 
negative coefficients of predicted hedge ratio in model 3 and 9 indicate that the more firm hedges 
according to its demand, the lower the market timing profits will be. Thus, the difference 
between reported profits and estimated profits is a good proxy for market timing profits. 
2. Feedback Effect on Hedging Activities 
Our results have implied that firms are timing the market and holding corresponding 
derivatives contracts. Now, we turn into another issue about whether firms’ current derivatives 




the impact transmitted from the change of prices to corporate decisions. The issue is part of the 
current topic of the real effects of financial markets (e.g., Bond et al. (2012)). The empirical 
findings shed light on the debate in extant literature about whether firms are indeed hedging their 
future production, or are using derivatives as investment (or speculation) tools and seeking for 
positive returns. In this section, the key question of interest is: how current gains or losses on 
derivatives contracts affect firms’ future hedging decisions?  
We run the following regression: 
𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽×𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾×𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (5) 
where subscript i refers to the firm, subscript t refers to the time in years, ηt refers to time fixed 
effects, and µi refers to firm fixed effects. Again, we use two proxies for hedge ratio and the 
three measures of hedging profits as discussed above.  
It is in our interest to examine the significance and sign of the coefficient 𝛽. If hedging 
activities are solely driven by hedging demand, then the coefficient on hedging gains should be 
zero. However, if current period’s hedging is influenced by the hedging outcome of the previous 
period, then the coefficient 𝛽 should be significantly different from zero.  
Table 10 examines the feedback effect on hedging activities using Relative Delta 
Production as the dependent variable. Model 1 studies the determinant of Relative Delta 
Production without looking at previous derivative profits. The independent variables in column 1 
are firm specific characteristics. Consistent with the literature, we find that the coefficient on 
previous year’s Oil Price Volatility is positively significant at the 1% level (Oil Price Volatility 
and Gas Price Volatility are collinear variables so we only include Oil Price Volatility). 
Dividend, which is a commitment on future payments, is positively significant at the 1% level, 




hedge. Cash, which proxies for liquidity, is negatively significant at the 1% level. Firm size is 
negatively correlated with Relative Delta Production. Interestingly, the Leverage Ratio, which is 
related to financial constraints, exhibits a positive and significant relationship with hedge ratio. 
We then introduce Lag Reported Total Profit in model 2 and 3, Lag Reported Realized 
Hedge Profit in model 4 and 5, and Lag Reported non-Hedge Profit in model 6 and 7. Model 3, 5 
and 7 includes both year fixed effects and firm fixed effects.  
As given in column 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, in spite of the types of profits (total profit, realized 
hedge profit, or non-hedge profit), firms’ current Relative Delta Production is positively 
correlated with previous profits on derivatives contracts. For instance, in column 2, the 
coefficient of preceding year’s Reported Total Profit is significant at the 10% level. The result 
suggests the feedback effect on hedging activities. However, the results are not significant in 
most of other models when year fixed effects and firm fixed effects are included.  
Would previous gains on derivatives contracts affect firms’ current hedging activities 
differently than previous losses? This is a reasonable assumption because winners and losers are 
likely to hedge differently. When a firm has large hedging gains, it may reduce its position if it 
believes that the prices are mean reverting. Or the positive outcome may encourage the firm to 
hedge more. When a firm suffers large hedging losses, it may increase its position if it believes 
that the prices are mean reverting, or it may scale back its hedging position due to internal 
pressure. To answer this question, we divide our samples into two groups and repeat the 
regressions with year and firm fixed effects. In Table 11, model 1 and 2 are based on firms with 
gains on derivatives during the past year, and model 3 and 4 are based on firms with losses on 




Profit because of collinearity. As expected, we discover different feedback effects for the two 
groups.  
For firms with positive derivative profits, the feedback effect is positive, suggesting that 
firms benefit from past year’s derivatives positions tend to hold more derivatives relative to 
production in the current year. However, the coefficients are not significant. 
For firms with derivative losses, the feedback effect is in the opposite direction. For these 
firms, the losses on preceding year’s derivatives positions lead to greater hedge ratio in the 
current year. For example, the coefficient of Lag Reported Total Profit in column 3 is -7.782 and 
is significant at the 5% level, and a one standard deviation decrease in previous Reported Total 
Profit leads to a 0.3006 (30.06%) increase in current Relative Delta Production. The coefficient 
of Lag Reported non-Hedge Profit in column 4 is -9.352 and significant at the 1% level. It 
indicates a gambling behavior when firms bear a large loss from previous derivatives positions. 
They anticipate that the price will fall after the loss due to the price increase.  This result strongly 
contradicts traditional views on corporate hedging. It further strengthens our findings that some 
oil and gas firms behave as investors, and they are timing the market, holding a large amount of 
derivatives positions as a speculation.  
E. Robustness Tests 
1. Change of Profits and Change of Hedge Ratio 
To capture the dynamics of hedging profits and hedging activities, we modify equation 
(1) and run the following model: 
𝛥 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽×𝛥 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾×𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (6) 
where subscript i refers to the firm, subscript t refers to the time in years, ηt refers to time fixed 




between current year’s profits and last year’s profits, as the dependent variable. The independent 
variables include the change of hedge ratio, risk premia and fixed effects. 
As noted in Table 12, the positive relationship between hedging profits and hedging 
activities is still noteworthy. Firms’ change of hedging activities has a greater impact on non-
hedge designated profits than on hedge designated profits. Furthermore, for hedge designated 
profits, the coefficients of risk premia are all significant at the 1% level, with and without fixed 
effects, showing that regular hedging profits are closely linked to market risk premia.  
2. Decomposition of Hedge Ratio using Industry Median Hedge ratio 
In section 3, based on industry average hedge ratio, we conduct various tests to 
decompose hedge ratio into market timing and true hedging components. In the event that the 
industry mean is affected by outliers, we use industry median hedge ratio as a proxy for general 
hedging demand and get similar results in unreported tables. The market timing effect remains 
considerable. 
3. Upstream Oil and Gas Producers 
To identify firms in the upstream oil and gas sector and not to include midstream and 
downstream oil and gas firms, Doshi et al. (2014) utilize four different industry classification 
codes from Compustat: National American Industry Classification System (NAICS), Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC), S&P Industry Sector Code (SPCINDCD) and Global Industry 
Classification Sector Code (GSECTOR).  
We add NACIS and SPCINDCD as additional filtering criteria. In addition, we use 
GSUBIND (the fourth level in the hierarchy of the Global Industry Classification Standard) 
instead of GSECTOR (the first level in the hierarchy of the Global Industry Classification 




the following standards: SIC equals 1311 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas), NAICS equals 
211111 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction), SPCINDCD equals 380 (Oil & Gas 
Exploration & Production), GSUBIND equals 10102020 (Oil & Gas Exploration & Production). 
Since there are many missing values for SPCINDCD, to avoid accidentally excluding qualified 
oil and gas producers, we also allow SPCINDCD to be null if a firm meet all the other three 
criteria.  
By applying these criteria, 13 firms are excluded from our original samples, and the 
filtered samples include 88 unique firms. We rerun all the regressions in section 3 and get robust 
and consistent results. 
4. Contracts Mature in the Succeeding Year 
At the end of each fiscal year, oil and gas firms report their derivatives positions 
scheduled for the following years. The derivatives positions could be matured in different years 
in the future.  In this test, we only consider firms’ derivatives contracts scheduled for the 
following one year. To get firms’ hedge ratio, we then aggregate the delta (or notional amount) 
of these outstanding contracts and normalize it by annual production for the following year.  
The results are similar to those in the key regressions of predicting profits in section 3. 
All of the regressions in Table 13 include both of year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. The 
coefficients of hedge ratio and market timing activities are still positively correlated with 
Reported Total Profit and economically significant.  
The findings in Table 14 are also consistent with previous regressions evaluating 
feedback effect. All of the regressions include both of year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. 
Column 1 and 4 examine the feedback effect on hedging activities. The coefficient on Lag 




sub-groups base on the sign of their profits, we find similar feedback effects as that in section 3. 
Column 2 and 5 include firms with positive profits in the previous year. The greater the profit 
they gained in the past year, the greater the hedge ratio they maintain in the current year. Column 
3 and 6 include firms with negative profits in the previous year. The coefficients in model 3 and 
6 are both negatively significant. The greater the loss they suffered in the previous year, the 
greater the hedge ratio they maintain in the current year. The conflicting direction of feedback 
effects for these two groups suggests that firms behave as market timers and speculators in the 
derivatives market. 
5. Sub-period from 2008 to 2011 
We also revisit the feedback effect of hedging by using a sub-period from 2008 to 2011. 
The reason we exclude the 2007 samples is that crude oil price rose sharply during 2007, and 
firms’ derivatives positions generated a loss on average. This brings us to the question about how 
firms changed their hedging strategies after the initial price shock in our sample period. As 
displayed in Panel D of Table 2, the average total loss on derivatives in 2007 is 1.30% of total 
assets. The reported total gains or losses then become positive during all years afterward, even if 
oil price rose again in 2009. Do firms react differently to the abrupt price movement? As seen 
from Table 2 of Panel C, firms indeed increase their hedge ratio after 2007. To further answer 
this question, we reexamine the feedback effect of hedging by focusing on the 2008-2011 sub-
period.  
Table 15 reports the feedback effect of hedging for 2008-2011 and the results are quite 
consistent with Table 10.  
Table 16 investigates the feedback effect on hedging for winners and losers respectively 




still motivate losers to increase hedge ratio as we found before. The positive correlations 
between risk premia and hedge ratio for winners in model 1 and 2 indicate that winners 
successfully predict the direction of risk premia after 2007 and adjust their hedge ratio 
accordingly. Current hedge ratio is also positively correlated with past reported total profits. On 
the other hand, the coefficients of risk premia for losers are negative in model 3 and 4, showing 
that losers fail to bet on the right direction of risk premia for their short positions. In addition, 
despite the past losses, they still raise hedge ratio. The coefficients of profit variables in model 3 
and 4 are both negative and are significant. 
F. Conclusion 
Recent literature studies how companies use market-timing in corporate financing and 
payout decisions (e.g., Bolton et al. (2013)). However, the literature has been debating whether 
management should incorporate their view of the market in risk management. Hedging the price 
exposure to product market risk is quite different from hedging interest rate risk and foreign 
exchange risk. Due to the investment on the information of product market, firms may possess 
information advantage on hedging the market risk of their products (e.g., Stulz (1996)). Cheng 
and Xiong (2013) find that commodity hedgers act like speculators and trade actively on 
derivatives markets. Altogether, the practice warrants more investigations.  
While the U.S. oil and gas producers have been extensively studied by researchers, we 
provide new evidence on hedging in the industry. Based on our samples and sample period from 
2007 to 2011, we show that the U.S. oil and gas producers on average gain from their hedging 
activities. Such gains are positively related to the hedge ratio and the market timing activities. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Natural Gas and Crude Oil Contracts 
 
The table presents the summary statistics of natural gas and crude oil contracts. Panel A gives the 
number and the notional amount of contracts. The notional amount is in Bcf (billion cubic feet) 
for natural gas contracts and in Mmbbl (million barrels) for crude oil contracts. Panel B 
summarizes the types of contracts, which include call options, put options, ceilings, floors, 
collars, three-way collars, forwards and swaps contracts. The notional amount is in Mmboe 
(million barrels of oil equivalent). Panel C and Panel D provides contracts information for 
natural gas and crude oil respectively. 
 
Panel A - Commodity Contracts 
 
 




Year Number Notional (Bcf) Number Notional (Mmbbl)
2006 522 3201.59 474 386.43
2007 659 5838.64 625 510.63
2008 646 6405.47 516 440.46
2009 714 7447.16 590 565.44
2010 484 7226.55 652 648.74
2011 402 7323.74 660 658.19
Gas Contracts Oil Contracts
Call Put Ceiling Floor Collar Three Forward Swap
N 31 33 0 25 417 35 24 431
Notional 4.54 49.30 0.00 16.45 280.84 116.65 5.72 446.54
N 29 54 10 86 441 26 20 618
Notional 90.20 74.38 2.42 38.83 397.45 171.38 19.89 689.19
N 34 57 8 54 453 35 7 514
Notional 130.43 96.03 1.94 24.92 418.99 129.58 4.13 702.02
N 20 65 18 38 432 37 7 687
Notional 187.39 56.39 26.00 49.46 368.17 278.09 1.98 839.17
N 44 58 7 17 329 68 3 610
Notional 359.94 84.98 1.93 5.79 347.43 265.53 1.07 786.49
N 45 52 0 5 253 96 2 610










Table 1: Summary Statistics of Natural Gas and Crude Oil Contracts (Cont.) 
 
Panel C - Natural Gas Contracts (notional amount in Bcf) 
 
 






Call Put Ceiling Floor Collar Three Forward Swap
N 18 5 0 16 224 16 14 229
Notional 18.14 3.23 0.00 41.98 973.39 229.07 31.80 1903.98
N 12 26 4 26 212 13 10 356
Notional 382.56 76.72 4.10 27.54 1455.91 633.98 51.63 3206.20
N 13 24 4 22 253 25 2 303
Notional 571.95 206.09 4.39 20.08 1684.12 614.76 8.60 3295.48
N 8 43 6 14 221 21 4 397
Notional 1000.39 193.63 7.16 40.05 1188.04 1187.37 6.46 3824.07
N 8 19 3 5 124 18 3 304
Notional 1658.80 268.74 6.59 7.39 992.57 827.72 6.43 3458.31
N 25 19 0 1 91 19 1 246







Call Put Ceiling Floor Collar Three Forward Swap
N 13 28 0 9 193 19 10 202
Notional 1.52 48.76 0.00 9.46 118.61 78.47 0.42 129.21
N 17 28 6 60 227 13 10 259
Notional 26.44 61.59 1.74 34.24 154.58 65.72 11.28 154.80
N 21 33 4 32 200 10 5 211
Notional 35.10 61.69 1.21 21.58 138.30 27.12 2.70 152.77
N 12 22 12 24 211 16 3 290
Notional 20.66 24.12 24.81 42.78 170.16 80.19 0.90 201.82
N 36 39 4 12 205 50 0 306
Notional 83.47 40.19 0.83 4.56 182.00 127.58 0.00 210.11
N 19 33 0 4 162 77 1 364










Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables and Control Variables 
 
This table provides summary statistics of key variables and control variables. Panel A reports the 
summary statistics for key dependent variables including hedge ratio variables and reported 
profits variables. Reported profits variables are normalized by total assets.  The p-values of t-test 
of means are reported in the last column. Panel B lists the summary statistics for major control 
variables. Number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 25 percentile, median, and 75 
percentile are reported. Cash, Inventory, Cost of Goods Sold, ROA, Revenue and Capital 
Expenditure are normalized by total assets. Dividend is normalized by number of shares 
outstanding. Panel C provides summary statistics of Relative Delta Production and Relative 
Notional Production during sample period from 2007 to 2011. Panel D provides summary 
statistics of Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported non-Hedge 
Profit during sample period from 2007 to 2011. Panel E reports the annual mean of Oil and Gas 
Futures Risk Premia. Panel F reports the comparison of hedge results. If a firm is able to 
generate positive hedge profits in at least 4 years, then we can call it a Good Hedger, otherwise 
we call it a Mediocre Hedger.  
 
Panel A - Key Variables 
 
 
Panel B - Control Variables 
 
 
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 p-value
Relative Delta Production 397 0.8448 0.7711 0.2915 0.6257 1.1370 0.0000
Relative Notional Production 397 1.0412 0.9002 0.4094 0.7862 1.4235 0.0000
Reported Total Profit 397 0.0178 0.0507 -0.0062 0.0063 0.0376 0.0000
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 178 0.0153 0.0404 -0.0049 0.0014 0.0212 0.0000
Reported non-Hedge Profit 322 0.0134 0.0487 -0.0067 0.0046 0.0312 0.0000
Reported Ineffective Hedge Profit 76 0.0000 0.0023 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0005 0.4270
Reported Raw Profit ($Million) 397 74.8980 337.5571 -4.4000 5.9190 48.4250 0.0000
Accumulate Raw Profit ($Million) 105 283.1857 1056.7660 0.0000 30.1820 171.0000 0.0036
N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Oil Futures Risk Premia 397 -2.3005 22.2269 -10.3318 -8.8114 -1.3862
Gas Futures Risk Premia 397 1.9426 1.8944 1.2635 1.7179 2.1531
Lag Oil Price Volatility 397 0.4153 0.1154 0.2902 0.4281 0.4572
Lifting Cost per Boe 366 14.1586 9.4407 9.0963 12.1416 16.9344
Market to Book Ratio 381 2.0622 5.8924 1.0771 1.8270 2.7813
Leverage Ratio 397 0.3578 0.2194 0.2226 0.3256 0.4551
Log Asset 397 7.3188 1.5094 6.1880 7.2613 8.2405
Cash 397 0.0354 0.0521 0.0030 0.0156 0.0460
Inventory 374 0.0059 0.0107 0.0000 0.0010 0.0078
Cost of Goods Sold 397 0.1810 0.2456 0.0600 0.0933 0.1674
ROA 397 -0.0348 0.2423 -0.0544 0.0184 0.0604
Revenue 397 0.2991 0.1707 0.1989 0.2680 0.3573
Dividend 397 0.0123 0.0352 0.0000 0.0000 0.0048
Capital Expenditure 397 0.2351 0.1418 0.1306 0.2188 0.3225




Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables (Cont.) 
 
Panel C – Relative Delta Production and Relative Notional Production, 2007 to 2011 
 
 
Panel D – Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported non-Hedge 
Profit, 2007 to 2011 
 
 
Panel E – Oil and Gas Futures Risk Premia, 2007 to 2011 
 
 
Year N Mean SD P25 Median P75 N Mean SD P25 Median P75
2007 70 0.6518 0.7537 0.1933 0.4388 0.8826 70 0.8490 0.9227 0.2656 0.6149 1.1771
2008 87 0.8645 0.8621 0.2813 0.5098 1.1803 87 1.1020 1.0165 0.3930 0.7766 1.4399
2009 79 0.9517 0.7835 0.3409 0.7683 1.3995 79 1.1161 0.9218 0.4241 0.8462 1.4918
2010 83 0.9450 0.7371 0.3866 0.8410 1.3182 83 1.1521 0.8404 0.5048 0.9939 1.6656
2011 78 0.7813 0.6763 0.2977 0.6132 1.0034 78 0.9519 0.7567 0.4249 0.7816 1.2593
Total 397 0.8448 0.7711 0.2915 0.6257 1.1370 397 1.0412 0.9002 0.4094 0.7862 1.4235
Relative Delta Production Relative Notional Production
Year N Mean SD P25 Median P75 N Mean SD P25 Median P75
2007 70 -0.0130 0.0358 -0.0219 -0.0045 0.0068 40 0.0066 0.0156 -0.0030 0.0016 0.0152
2008 87 0.0316 0.0614 -0.0072 0.0119 0.0668 41 -0.0120 0.0168 -0.0221 -0.0091 -0.0005
2009 79 0.0255 0.0599 -0.0155 0.0158 0.0556 36 0.0573 0.0551 0.0139 0.0463 0.0903
2010 83 0.0229 0.0446 -0.0015 0.0103 0.0418 31 0.0181 0.0387 -0.0018 0.0057 0.0399
2011 78 0.0169 0.0305 -0.0019 0.0074 0.0319 30 0.0106 0.0258 -0.0026 0.0014 0.0199
Total 397 0.0178 0.0507 -0.0062 0.0063 0.0376 178 0.0153 0.0404 -0.0049 0.0014 0.0212
Year N Mean SD P25 Median P75
2007 45 -0.0259 0.0365 -0.0329 -0.0103 -0.0020
2008 68 0.0463 0.0587 0.0017 0.0331 0.0807
2009 66 0.0002 0.0487 -0.0250 -0.0011 0.0205
2010 74 0.0177 0.0374 -0.0030 0.0051 0.0271
2011 69 0.0145 0.0298 -0.0003 0.0074 0.0279
Total 322 0.0134 0.0487 -0.0067 0.0046 0.0312
Reported non-Hedge Profit 








Panel F – Comparison of Hedge Results
Difference p-value
N Mean N Mean of Mean
Relative Delta Production 133 0.893 264 0.820 0.073 0.1871
Reported  Total Profit 133 0.034 264 0.010 0.024 0.0000




Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(1) Relative Delta Production 1
(2) Relative Notional Production 0.910 1
(3) Reported Total Profit 0.673 0.537 1
(4) Reported Realized Hedge Profit 0.422 0.317 0.571 1
(5) Reported non-Hedge Profit 0.416 0.349 0.613 -0.277 1
(6) Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.060 0.016 0.143 0.509 -0.336 1
(7) Gas Futures Risk Premia 0.065 0.031 0.147 0.522 -0.347 0.9939 1
(8) Lag Oil Price Volatility 0.152 0.206 0.242 0.224 0.069 0.1105 0.1498 1
(9) Lifting Cost per Boe -0.117 -0.001 -0.205 -0.162 -0.075 -0.155 -0.149 -0.141 1
(10) Market to Book Ratio 0.053 0.315 -0.149 0.059 -0.230 0.030 0.068 0.1844 0.396 1
(11) Leverage Ratio 0.294 0.355 0.290 0.047 0.311 -0.016 -0.031 0.070 0.0525 -0.009 1
(12) Log Asset -0.551 -0.484 -0.297 -0.313 -0.086 0.031 0.015 -0.033 -0.090 -0.137 -0.175 1
(13) Cash -0.134 -0.149 -0.148 -0.154 -0.032 -0.050 -0.034 0.152 -0.135 -0.010 -0.275 -0.041 1
(14) Inventory -0.293 -0.263 -0.128 -0.119 -0.037 -0.079 -0.090 0.012 -0.081 -0.065 -0.162 0.468 0.023 1
(15) Cost of Goods Sold -0.076 0.039 -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 -0.046 -0.069 0.030 0.177 0.115 0.065 0.128 -0.102 0.6651 1
(16) ROA -0.183 -0.211 -0.260 0.082 -0.405 -0.195 -0.195 -0.192 0.085 0.157 -0.405 0.151 -0.003 0.1353 -0.125 1
(17) Revenue 0.009 0.025 0.016 0.145 -0.090 -0.182 -0.192 -0.024 0.187 0.158 -0.180 0.055 -0.137 0.662 0.7961 0.2269 1
(18) Dividend 0.387 0.308 0.170 0.552 -0.260 0.025 0.026 0.015 0.114 0.175 -0.081 -0.361 -0.114 -0.012 0.050 0.4109 0.3634 1
(19) Capital Expenditure -0.097 -0.064 -0.159 -0.229 0.007 -0.349 -0.358 -0.285 -0.273 -0.152 0.133 -0.206 0.110 -0.221 -0.076 -0.005 -0.197 -0.150 1









Table 4: Hedging Profits and Hedging Activities 
 
The dependent variables include Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported non-Hedge Profit. The key 
independent variable is Relative Delta Production. Oil Risk Premia and Gas Risk Premia are also included. Please see Appendix A for 
detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effect in column 2, 5 and 8. We control for both year and firm fixed 
effect in column 3, 6 and 9. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. 
 
Hedging Profits and Relative Delta Production 
 
  

























Relative Delta Production 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.006* 0.005 0.008 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.020***
(5.55) (5.00) (3.09) (1.71) (1.41) (1.63) (5.45) (5.19) (3.38)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001**
(2.60) (4.33) (3.67) (0.21) (6.41) (7.88) (3.24) (2.74) (2.34)
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.030*** 0.009 -0.044***
(-2.70) (0.81) (-3.93)
Observations 397 397 397 178 178 178 322 322 322









Table 5: Hedging Profits, Hedging Activities and Market Timing Activities – Deviated from Industry Mean 
 
The dependent variables include Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported non-Hedge Profit. The 
independent variables are Industry Mean Delta and Delta Deviated from Industry Mean. Oil Risk Premia and Gas Risk Premia are also 
included. Please see Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effect in column 2, 5 and 8. We 
control for both year and firm fixed effect in column 3, 6 and 9. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5% 
and 10% significant levels. 
 
Hedging Profits and Market Timing Activities Based on Industry Mean Relative Delta Production 
  

























Delta Deviated from Mean 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.019***
(4.70) (4.72) (3.36) (1.31) (1.31) (1.62) (4.78) (4.83) (3.57)
Industry Mean Delta 0.123*** 0.048** 0.145***
(5.42) (2.09) (6.14)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001***
(1.60) (4.94) (4.45) (-0.35) (6.65) (8.56) (2.51) (3.29) (3.04)
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.020* 0.016 -0.036***
(-1.77) (1.30) (-3.33)
Observations 397 397 397 178 178 178 322 322 322









Table 6: Hedging Profits, Hedging Activities and Market Timing Activities – from Residual Perspective on Industry Mean 
 
The dependent variables include Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported non-Hedge Profit. The 
independent variables are regression Residuals representing market timing activities, and Predicted values representing hedging 
activities (we regress firm’s Relative Delta Production on industry mean, firm characteristics, and risk premia to get the Residual and 
Predicted value). Please see Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effect in column 2, 5 and 8. 
We control for both year and firm fixed effect in column 3, 6 and 9. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 
5% and 10% significant levels. 
 





























Residual from Industry Mean Delta 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.011* 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.025***
(5.40) (5.46) (4.09) (2.47) (2.39) (1.89) (4.72) (4.86) (3.89)
Predicted from Industry Mean Delta 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.016 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.013 0.026*** 0.017** 0.011
(4.63) (3.22) (0.86) (3.57) (2.89) (0.82) (3.85) (2.51) (0.59)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.000* 0.001*
(2.35) (2.81) (2.48) (0.03) (5.15) (5.60) (2.93) (1.68) (1.73)
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.029** 0.012 -0.043***
(-2.47) (0.94) (-3.59)
Observations 350 350 350 151 151 151 279 279 279









Table 7: Hedging Profits, Hedging Activities and Market Timing Activities – with Residual Fixed Effect  
 
The dependent variables include Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported non-Hedge Profit. The key 
independent variables are regression Residuals representing market timing activities, and Predicted values representing hedging 
activities (we regress firm’s Relative Delta Production on industry average, risk premia, firm characteristics and firm fixed effect to 
get the Residual and Predicted value). Please see Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effect 
in column 2, 5 and 8. We control for both year and firm fixed effect in column 3, 6 and 9. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. 
 
Hedging Profits and Market Timing Activities Based on Relative Delta Production 
 
 

























Residual Delta Fixed Effect 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.010 0.011 0.011* 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.016***
(2.70) (2.70) (3.09) (1.03) (1.15) (1.81) (2.84) (2.64) (2.61)
Predicted Delta Fixed Effect 0.026*** 0.023*** -0.016 0.023*** 0.021*** -0.024 0.015*** 0.012*** -0.035*
(5.40) (4.68) (-0.78) (4.46) (3.89) (-1.47) (3.24) (2.67) (-1.70)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.000 0.001***
(1.54) (2.60) (3.91) (-0.04) (5.67) (7.48) (1.84) (0.99) (2.89)
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.019 0.014 -0.031**
(-1.58) (1.08) (-2.54)
Log Asset -0.000 -0.000 0.017 -0.002 -0.003 0.037*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(-0.02) (-0.17) (1.62) (-1.26) (-1.37) (3.44) (0.67) (0.47) (0.16)
ROA 0.014 0.020 0.046*** 0.019 0.021 0.015 -0.008 0.000 0.037*
(0.93) (1.26) (2.75) (1.31) (1.39) (1.34) (-0.46) (0.02) (1.81)
leverage 0.038** 0.038*** 0.047 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.062*
(2.58) (2.61) (1.46) (0.39) (0.40) (0.13) (3.74) (3.88) (1.75)
Revenue 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.282*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.255*** 0.021 0.014 0.194***
(3.76) (3.41) (6.91) (3.79) (3.64) (5.61) (1.39) (0.90) (4.86)
Observations 327 327 327 139 139 139 256 256 256









Table 8: Estimated Profits, Hedging Activities and Market Timing Activities – from Residual Perspective on Industry Mean 
 
The dependent variables include the differences between reported profits and estimated profits. The independent variables are 
regression Residuals representing market timing activities, and Predicted values representing hedging activities (we regress firm’s 
Relative Delta Production on industry mean, firm characteristics, and risk premia to get the Residual and Predicted value). Please see 
Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effect in column 2, 5 and 8. We control for both year 
and firm fixed effect in column 3, 6 and 9. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant 
levels. 
 
Market Timing Profits and Market Timing Activities Based on Industry Mean Relative Delta Production 
  


































Residual from Industry Mean Delta 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.050*** 0.028** 0.027** 0.041** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.053***
(3.77) (3.81) (3.15) (2.52) (2.49) (2.03) (3.44) (3.49) (3.05)
Predicted from Industry Mean Delta 0.019 0.006 -0.017 0.017 0.010 -0.008 0.013 -0.001 -0.017
(1.38) (0.43) (-0.38) (1.08) (0.61) (-0.16) (0.84) (-0.09) (-0.33)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.008*** -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.010*** -0.000 0.000
(3.68) (-0.15) (0.65) (1.36) (1.19) (1.32) (4.01) (-0.18) (0.27)
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.110*** -0.038 -0.140***
(-4.49) (-1.39) (-4.99)
Observations 350 350 350 151 151 151 279 279 279









Table 9: Estimated Profits, Hedging Activities and Market Timing Activities – with Residual Fixed Effect  
 
The dependent variables include the differences between reported profits and estimated profits. The key independent variables are 
regression Residuals representing market timing activities, and Predicted values representing hedging activities (we regress firm’s 
Relative Delta Production on industry average, risk premia, firm characteristics and firm fixed effect to get the Residual and Predicted 
value). Please see Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effect in column 2, 5 and 8. We 
control for both year and firm fixed effect in column 3, 6 and 9. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5% 
and 10% significant levels. 
 
   


































Residual Delta Fixed Effect 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.027 0.028 0.025 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.052***
(3.18) (3.18) (3.10) (1.27) (1.28) (1.43) (3.41) (3.29) (2.89)
Predicted Delta Fixed Effect 0.026** 0.022** -0.035 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.143*** 0.017 0.013 -0.147**
(2.57) (2.12) (-0.67) (3.22) (2.93) (3.28) (1.47) (1.09) (-2.51)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.006*** -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.000 0.007*** -0.001 0.001
(2.60) (-0.66) (1.08) (1.10) (0.85) (-0.35) (2.86) (-0.94) (1.48)
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.086*** -0.031 -0.114***
(-3.27) (-1.08) (-3.77)
Log Asset 0.003 0.003 0.052* 0.001 0.001 0.081*** 0.005 0.004 0.034
(0.86) (0.81) (1.94) (0.34) (0.30) (2.77) (1.03) (0.95) (1.16)
ROA -0.032 -0.020 0.012 -0.020 -0.017 -0.030 -0.073* -0.053 -0.023
(-0.96) (-0.59) (0.28) (-0.59) (-0.51) (-0.98) (-1.68) (-1.22) (-0.41)
leverage 0.054* 0.056* 0.085 0.055 0.054 -0.022 0.067* 0.070* 0.078
(1.70) (1.76) (1.04) (1.45) (1.42) (-0.30) (1.73) (1.83) (0.77)
Revenue 0.070** 0.060* 0.419*** 0.017 0.016 0.273** 0.030 0.016 0.370***
(2.00) (1.70) (4.08) (0.46) (0.42) (2.21) (0.78) (0.40) (3.26)
Observations 327 327 327 139 139 139 256 256 256









Table 10: Feedback Effect on Hedging Activities 
 
The dependent variable is Relative Delta Production. The key independent variables are Lag 
Reported Total Profit, Lag Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Lag Reported non-Hedge Profit. 
Risk premia and firm characteristics are also included as control variables. We control for both 
of year and firm fixed effect in column 3, 5 and 7. Please see Appendix A for detailed definition 
of the variables. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% 
significant levels. 
 
Dependent Variable: Relative Delta Production 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag Reported Total Profit 1.318* 0.488
(1.70) (0.82)
Lag Reported Realized Hedge Profit 2.124 1.218
(1.31) (0.67)
Lag Reported non-Hedge Profit 0.824 0.414
(0.83) (0.53)
Lag Oil Price Volatility 0.975*** 0.638 0.137 0.804
(3.21) (1.49) (0.23) (1.56)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.012 -0.001 0.004** -0.010 0.005* 0.002 0.004*
(0.85) (-0.04) (2.17) (-0.34) (1.86) (0.10) (1.78)
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.138 -0.004 0.116 -0.026
(-0.83) (-0.02) (0.33) (-0.10)
Lifting Cost per Boe 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.013** -0.005 -0.001 0.004
(0.40) (0.29) (-0.35) (-2.20) (-0.49) (-0.19) (0.50)
Market to Book Ratio -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.110** -0.026 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.44) (-0.75) (-1.22) (-2.60) (-0.81) (-0.47) (-1.07)
Leverage Ratio 1.033*** 0.908*** -0.457 0.198 -0.203 1.079*** -0.511
(5.53) (4.18) (-1.28) (0.63) (-0.41) (3.89) (-1.01)
Log Asset -0.017 -0.017 0.050 -0.043 -0.110 -0.031 0.014
(-0.55) (-0.44) (0.32) (-0.80) (-0.37) (-0.65) (0.08)
Cash -2.429*** -2.644*** -1.040 -3.930** 1.250 -2.386*** -1.416
(-3.83) (-3.59) (-1.29) (-2.61) (0.70) (-2.83) (-1.50)
Inventory -2.311 -0.958 3.773 0.822 5.075 -5.639 2.027
(-0.61) (-0.22) (0.61) (0.13) (0.49) (-1.07) (0.26)
Cost of Goods Sold -0.245 -0.066 -0.141 -0.920 0.004 -0.206 -0.242
(-0.78) (-0.19) (-0.45) (-1.50) (0.01) (-0.53) (-0.68)
ROA 0.151 0.308 0.054 -0.800 0.018 0.293 0.039
(0.44) (0.80) (0.16) (-1.45) (0.04) (0.64) (0.10)
Revenue -0.377 -0.649* 0.562 0.004 0.822 -0.140 0.528
(-1.16) (-1.73) (1.20) (0.01) (1.20) (-0.32) (0.95)
Dividend 5.448*** 7.212*** -7.562* 7.941*** -4.725 7.157*** -7.421*
(5.53) (5.77) (-1.88) (4.32) (-0.72) (4.78) (-1.72)
Capital Expenditure -0.173 -0.004 0.600* -0.349 0.753 -0.143 0.476
(-0.66) (-0.01) (1.75) (-0.55) (1.16) (-0.35) (1.15)
S&P Rating -0.084 -0.110 0.013 -0.144 -0.159 -0.069 0.222
(-0.91) (-0.95) (0.09) (-1.02) (-0.89) (-0.47) (1.22)
Observations 327 260 260 110 110 203 203




Table 11: Feedback Effect on Hedging Activities – Gain or Loss Status 
 
The dependent variable is Relative Delta Production. The key independent variables are Lag 
Reported Total Profit, Lag Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Lag Reported non-Hedge Profit. 
Risk premia and firm characteristics are also included as control variables. Column 1 and 2 
include firm-years with positive profits only. Column 3 and 4 include firm-years with negative 
profits only. We control for both of year and firm fixed effect in all regressions. Please see 
Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. 
 
Dependent Variable: Relative Delta Production 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Reported Total Profit 0.693 -7.782**
(0.65) (-2.50)
Lag Reported non-Hedge Profit 0.420 -9.352***
(0.22) (-3.93)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002 0.003 -0.006 -0.004
(1.07) (0.66) (-1.06) (-0.82)
Lifting Cost per Boe 0.011 0.017 -0.044 -0.006
(0.88) (1.09) (-1.34) (-0.16)
Market to Book Ratio -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(-0.61) (-0.38) (0.04) (-0.19)
Leverage Ratio -0.151 0.149 -2.585 -1.497
(-0.33) (0.23) (-1.63) (-1.21)
Log Asset 0.012 -0.053 0.396 0.028
(0.06) (-0.21) (0.89) (0.08)
Cash -2.588** -3.574** -0.441 -0.103
(-2.04) (-2.17) (-0.34) (-0.09)
Inventory -4.649 -5.650 24.124 1.502
(-0.57) (-0.47) (1.21) (0.09)
Cost of Goods Sold -0.417 -0.602 0.548 0.598
(-1.33) (-1.63) (0.46) (0.59)
ROA -0.432 -0.592 0.953 0.966
(-1.25) (-1.27) (0.81) (0.95)
Revenue -0.273 -1.082 -1.562 -0.934
(-0.32) (-0.84) (-0.95) (-0.73)
Dividend -12.229** -19.858 -1.213 0.814
(-2.17) (-1.27) (-0.08) (0.07)
Capital Expenditure 0.013 0.017 0.441 0.405
(0.03) (0.03) (0.58) (0.60)
S&P Rating 0.073 0.172 0.054 0.297
(0.47) (0.69) (0.17) (0.94)
Observations 150 107 110 96




Table 12: Change of Hedging Profits and Change of Hedging Activities 
 
The dependent variables include change of Reported Total Profit, change of Reported Realized Hedge Profit and change of Reported 
non-Hedge Profit. The key independent variable is change of Relative Delta Production. Oil Risk Premia and Gas Risk Premia are also 
included. Please see Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effect in column 2, 5 and 8. We 
control for both year and firm fixed effect in column 3, 6 and 9. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5% 
and 10% significant levels. 
 































Δ Relative Delta Production 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.008 0.008 0.017* 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.031***
(3.92) (3.44) (3.21) (1.32) (1.40) (1.87) (4.12) (3.42) (2.78)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002***
(1.01) (-3.56) (-2.87) (6.00) (10.35) (9.06) (-0.14) (-8.92) (-7.16)
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.028 -0.071*** -0.017
(-1.32) (-4.77) (-0.77)
Observations 267 267 267 118 118 118 210 210 210









Table 13: Regression on Reported Total Profit – Contracts for Next Year Only 
 
For all models, the dependent variable is Reported Total Profit, and both year fixed effect and firm fixed effect are included. The 
independent variables in column 1, 2, 3 and 4 are delta related variables and replicate the key regressions to predict profits in Section 
3. The independent variables in column 5, 6, 7 and 8 are notional amount related variables and replicate the key regressions to predict 
profits in Section 3. Please see Appendix A for detailed definition of variables. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. 
 

















Relative Delta Production 0.029***
(3.81)
Delta Deviated from Mean 0.026***
(3.67)
Residual from Industry Mean Delta 0.033***
(3.89)
Predicted from Industry Mean Delta 0.017
(0.59)
Residual Delta Fixed Effect 0.029***
(3.14)
Predicted Delta Fixed Effect 0.058***
(2.62)
Relative Notional Production 0.027***
(4.47)
Notional Deviated from Mean 0.028***
(4.77)
Residual from Industry Mean Notional 0.031***
(4.85)
Predicted from Industry Mean Notional 0.008
(0.40)
Residual Notional Fixed Effect 0.025***
(3.54)
Predicted Notional Fixed Effect 0.053***
(2.96)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000
(3.87) (4.70) (2.63) (1.64) (3.92) (4.18) (3.03) (1.60)
Observations 353 353 317 295 353 353 317 295













Table 14: Regression on Feedback Effect – Contracts for Next Year Only 
 
The dependent variable is Relative Delta Production in column 1, 2, and 3, and Relative Notional 
Production in column 4, 5 and 6. For all models, both year fixed effect and firm fixed effect are 
included. The independent variables are Lag Reported Total Profit and firm characteristics. 
These regressions replicate the key feedback effect regressions in Section 3. Column 1 and 4 
examine the feedback effect on hedging activities without dividing the samples into sub-groups. 
Column 2 and 5 include firms with positive profit in previous year. Column 3 and 6 include 
firms with negative profit in previous year. Please see Appendix A for detailed definition of 





















Lag Reported Total Profit 0.352 0.683 -6.421*** 1.191* 0.562 -5.721***
(0.43) (0.06) (-3.55) (1.69) (0.02) (-3.10)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.003* 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.005
(1.73) (1.14) (-0.54) (1.50) (0.72) (-0.51)
Lifting Cost per Boe -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 -0.008 0.014 -0.039
(-1.03) (-0.45) (-0.43) (-0.96) (0.93) (-0.69)
Market to Book Ratio -0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006
(-0.74) (0.20) (-0.54) (-1.31) (-0.63) (-0.33)
Leverage Ratio -0.430 -0.412 -0.470 -0.333 -0.138 -3.686
(-1.33) (-0.90) (-0.33) (-0.80) (-0.27) (-1.63)
Log Asset 0.061 0.144 0.079 0.173 0.152 0.360
(0.41) (0.71) (0.20) (0.90) (0.66) (0.56)
Cash -0.794 -1.493 -0.398 -0.997 -2.519 -1.353
(-1.07) (-1.11) (-0.30) (-1.05) (-1.64) (-0.64)
Inventory 1.844 -5.688 22.719 11.365 -4.336 30.726
(0.30) (-0.65) (1.32) (1.46) (-0.44) (1.13)
Cost of Goods Sold -0.232 -0.367 1.836 -0.047 -0.279 1.905
(-0.81) (-1.19) (1.27) (-0.13) (-0.79) (0.83)
ROA -0.023 -0.420 2.639 0.182 -0.313 2.546
(-0.08) (-1.22) (1.72) (0.47) (-0.80) (1.05)
Revenue 0.783* 0.529 -1.605 0.857 0.643 -2.417
(1.71) (0.62) (-0.96) (1.45) (0.66) (-0.91)
Dividend -8.043** -12.419** 6.251 -8.788* -14.884** -4.849
(-2.22) (-2.22) (0.49) (-1.88) (-2.33) (-0.24)
Capital Expenditure 0.423 -0.057 0.585 0.479 -0.527 1.087
(1.35) (-0.12) (0.87) (1.19) (-1.00) (1.02)
S&P Rating -0.067 0.044 0.136 -0.038 0.109 -0.025
(-0.52) (0.29) (0.52) (-0.23) (0.62) (-0.06)
Observations 242 139 103 242 139 103




Table 15: Feedback Effect on Hedging Activities – Sub-period 2008-2011 
 
The models include data samples from 2008 to 2011 (data samples in year 2007 are not 
included). The dependent variable is Relative Delta Production. The key independent variables 
are Lag Reported Total Profit, Lag Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Lag Reported non-
Hedge Profit. Risk premia and firm characteristics are also included as control variables. We 
control for both of year and firm fixed effect in column 3, 5 and 7. Please see Appendix A for 
detailed definition of the variables. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents 
1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag Reported Total Profit 1.462* 0.475
(1.79) (0.73)
Lag Reported Realized Hedge Profit 2.222 0.996
(1.38) (0.52)
Lag Reported non-Hedge Profit 1.433 0.518
(1.28) (0.58)
Lag Oil Price Volatility 0.443 0.799* 0.276 0.975*
(1.09) (1.88) (0.49) (1.90)
Oil Futures Risk Premia -0.007 0.011 0.004** 0.011 0.004 0.008 0.005**
(-0.41) (0.56) (2.06) (0.40) (1.39) (0.33) (2.33)
Gas Futures Risk Premia 0.093 -0.135 -0.106 -0.097
(0.46) (-0.60) (-0.33) (-0.35)
Lifting Cost per Boe 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.009* -0.006 -0.003 0.003
(0.22) (-0.18) (-0.46) (-1.76) (-0.59) (-0.63) (0.33)
Market to Book Ratio -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.095** -0.025 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.37) (-0.54) (-1.10) (-2.43) (-0.77) (-0.30) (-0.95)
Leverage Ratio 0.969*** 0.640*** -0.433 0.075 -0.366 0.714** -0.685
(4.71) (2.79) (-1.10) (0.25) (-0.70) (2.35) (-1.22)
Log Asset -0.017 -0.049 -0.016 -0.047 -0.393 -0.066 0.031
(-0.45) (-1.23) (-0.09) (-0.91) (-1.25) (-1.35) (0.16)
Cash -2.656*** -3.032*** -1.075 -3.840*** 0.383 -2.825*** -1.624
(-3.70) (-3.87) (-1.26) (-2.69) (0.22) (-3.11) (-1.64)
Inventory -1.877 -3.304 -1.043 -0.119 4.445 -7.578 -4.838
(-0.44) (-0.72) (-0.15) (-0.02) (0.40) (-1.34) (-0.54)
Cost of Goods Sold -0.189 -0.293 -0.354 -1.597** -0.227 -0.416 -0.311
(-0.56) (-0.77) (-1.06) (-2.59) (-0.45) (-0.98) (-0.86)
ROA 0.116 0.017 -0.322 -1.340** -0.251 -0.090 -0.286
(0.31) (0.04) (-0.89) (-2.43) (-0.55) (-0.18) (-0.65)
Revenue -0.410 -0.491 0.864 0.183 1.122 0.085 0.891
(-1.14) (-1.16) (1.51) (0.29) (1.22) (0.17) (1.33)
Dividend 5.799*** 7.900*** -5.127 9.598*** 0.746 7.061*** -5.118
(5.19) (5.92) (-1.32) (4.70) (0.11) (4.73) (-1.26)
Capital Expenditure 0.003 -0.206 0.162 -0.041 0.452 -0.342 0.088
(0.01) (-0.57) (0.45) (-0.07) (0.67) (-0.78) (0.20)
S&P Rating -0.115 -0.034 -0.018 -0.146 -0.164 0.022 0.182
(-1.03) (-0.29) (-0.12) (-1.10) (-0.82) (0.14) (0.95)
Observations 272 238 238 102 102 185 185




Table 16: Feedback Effect on Hedging Activities – Gain or Loss Status, Sub-period 2008-
2011 
 
The models include data samples from 2008 to 2011 (data samples in year 2007 are not 
included). The dependent variable is Relative Delta Production. The key independent variables 
are Lag Reported Total Profit, Lag Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Lag Reported non-
Hedge Profit. Risk premia and firm characteristics are also included as control variables. Column 
1 and 2 include firm-years with positive profits only. Column 3 and 4 include firm-years with 
negative profits only. We control for both of year and firm fixed effect in all regressions. Please 
see Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, 
** and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Reported Total Profit 0.404 -6.726**
(0.34) (-2.72)
Lag Reported non-Hedge Profit 0.335 -5.099***
(0.16) (-3.62)
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.003 0.005 -0.018 -0.001
(1.40) (1.24) (-1.51) (-0.20)
Lifting Cost per Boe 0.010 0.013 -0.096 0.022
(0.77) (0.84) (-0.92) (0.47)
Market to Book Ratio -0.002 -0.001 0.022 0.010
(-0.55) (-0.35) (1.30) (0.66)
Leverage Ratio -0.064 0.014 -4.159* -2.511
(-0.12) (0.02) (-2.04) (-1.72)
Log Asset 0.060 0.026 -0.298 -0.155
(0.29) (0.10) (-0.51) (-0.37)
Cash -2.289 -2.928 -1.953 0.056
(-1.58) (-1.47) (-1.06) (0.04)
Inventory -5.237 -5.862 9.458 2.253
(-0.60) (-0.43) (0.41) (0.12)
Cost of Goods Sold -0.505 -0.626 2.488 2.120
(-1.52) (-1.61) (1.69) (1.67)
ROA -0.505 -0.587 2.107 2.575*
(-1.38) (-1.20) (1.23) (1.92)
Revenue -0.007 -0.651 -6.166* -1.795
(-0.01) (-0.46) (-2.06) (-0.85)
Dividend -10.552* -22.042 -15.805 4.008
(-1.81) (-1.36) (-0.74) (0.31)
Capital Expenditure -0.038 0.171 -0.851 -0.244
(-0.08) (0.26) (-0.73) (-0.24)
S&P Rating 0.049 0.154 -0.643 0.092
(0.31) (0.60) (-1.43) (0.23)
Observations 142 99 94 81




Appendix A: Glossary of Variables 
 
Reported Total Profit 
It is the sum of realized gain/loss of commodity cash flow hedge, realized and unrealized 
gain/loss of non-hedge designated commodity derivatives and realized and unrealized 
gain/loss of ineffective portion of commodity cash flow hedge. 
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 
It is the realized gain/loss of commodity cash flow hedge. 
Reported non-Hedge Profit 
It is the sum of realized and unrealized gain/loss of non-hedge designated commodity 
derivatives. 
Reported Realized non-Hedge Profit 
It is the realized gain/loss of non-hedge designated commodity derivatives. 
Reported Ineffective Hedge Profit 
Effectiveness is defined as the part of the gain (or loss) on the hedging instrument that 
offsets a loss (or gain) on the hedged item. For cash flow hedges, changes in the fair 
market value of a derivative are separated into an effective portion and an ineffective 
portion. The net gain or loss on the effective portion of the hedging instrument should be 
reported in OCI. The gain or loss on the ineffective portion is reported in current earnings 
(Baker & Lembke, Advanced Financial Accounting). 
Relative Delta Production 
It is the total delta of derivatives scaled by annual production. 
Relative Notional Production 





Industry Mean Delta 
It is the average value of all sample firms’ relative delta production in a year. 
Industry Median Delta 
It is the median value of all sample firms’ relative delta production in a year. 
Industry Mean Notional 
It is the average value of all sample firms’ relative notional production in a year. 
Industry Median Notional 
It is the median value of all sample firms’ relative delta production in a year. 
Delta Deviated from Mean 
It is the difference between a firm’s relative delta production and the average value of all 
sample firms’ relative delta production in a year. 
Delta Deviated from Median 
It is the difference between a firm’s relative delta production and the median value of all 
sample firms’ relative delta production in a year. 
Notional Deviated from Mean 
It is the difference between a firm’s relative notional production and the average value of 
all sample firms’ relative notional production in a year. 
Notional Deviated from Median 
It is the difference between a firm’s relative notional production and the median value of 
all sample firms’ relative notional production in a year. 




It is the regression residual value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative delta 
production on the average value of all sample firms’ relative delta production. 
Residual from Industry Median Delta 
It is the regression residual value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative delta 
production on the median value of all sample firms’ relative delta production. 
Residual from Industry Mean Notional 
It is the regression residual value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative notional 
production on the average value of all sample firms’ relative notional production. 
Residual from Industry Median Notional 
It is the regression residual value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative notional 
production on the median value of all sample firms’ relative notional production. 
Predicted from Industry Mean Delta 
It is the regression predicted value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative delta 
production on the average value of industry relative delta production. 
Predicted from Industry Median Delta 
It is the regression predicted value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative delta 
production on the median value of all sample firms’ relative delta production. 
Predicted from Industry Mean Notional 
It is the regression predicted value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative notional 
production on the average value of all sample firms’ relative notional production. 
Predicted from Industry Median Notional 
It is the regression predicted value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative notional 




Residual Delta Fixed Effect 
It is the regression residual value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative delta 
production on firm fixed effects and other key control variables. 
Predicted Delta Fixed Effect 
It is the regression predicted value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative delta 
production on firm fixed effects and other key control variables. 
Residual Notional Fixed Effect 
It is the regression residual value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative notional 
production on firm fixed effects and other key control variables. 
Predicted Notional Fixed Effect 
It is the regression predicted value calculated by regressing a firm’s relative notional 
production on firm fixed effects and other key control variables. 
Oil Futures Risk Premia 
It is the spread between the 1-year contracted oil futures price at year t-1, denoted by F(t-
1), and the realized spot price at year t, denoted by S(t). We calculate the oil futures risk 
premia for every business during the year t and then use the mean of each year in the 
regression.  
Gas Futures Risk Premia 
It is the spread between the 1-year contracted gas futures price at year t-1, denoted by F(t-
1), and the realized spot price at year t, denoted by S(t). We calculate the oil futures risk 






Lag Oil Price Volatility 
It is the average of annualized volatility of past year’s oil futures prices. 
Lag Gas Price Volatility 
It is the average of annualized volatility of past year’s gas futures prices. 
Lifting Cost per Boe 
It is the average cost to produce one barrel of oil equivalent (BOE). It is calculated 
as production costs divided by oil and gas production for the year. 
Market to Book Ratio 
It is a firm’s total market value (product of shares outstanding and fiscal year closing 
price) scaled by total common equity. 
Leverage Ratio 
It is a firm’s total debt (sum of total debt in current liabilities and total long-term debt) 
scaled by total assets. 
Log Asset 
It is the log value of a firm’s total assets. 
Cash 
It is a firm’s cash and cash equivalents. 
Inventory 
It is the merchandise bought for resale and materials and supplies purchased for use in 
production of revenue. 
Cost of Goods Sold 






Return on assets. It is a firm’s net income scaled by total assets. 
Revenue 
It is the gross income received from all divisions of the company. 
Dividend 
It is the total amount of dividends (other than stock dividends) declared on the 
common/ordinary capital of the company, based on the current year's net income. 
Capital Expenditure 
The funds used for additions to property, plant, and equipment, excluding amounts 
arising from acquisitions. 
S&P Rating Dummy 






Appendix B: Delta Calculation 
 
We find that U.S. oil and gas firms, on average, use a significant amount of derivatives. 
Our average hedge ratio is greater than that in prior research. To verify our calculation of delta, 
we use Jin and Jorion (2006)’s computation of delta as benchmark and examine the accuracy of 
our delta.  
The Appendix B of Jin and Jorion (2006) demonstrates the computation of delta for 
Devon, an oil producing firm. According to Devon’s 2001 annual report, the firm uses swaps, 
collars and fixed-price contracts. The annual report also discloses the volume, exercise price and 
maturity of each contract. As of December 2001, the firm has an outstanding swap contract of 
22,000 Bbls/day, a swap contract of 4,350 Bbls/day, a collar contract of 20,000 Bbls/day and a 
fixed-price contract of 10,032 Bbls/day.  
The swaps and fixed-price contracts exhibit linear payoff so the delta per unit of volume 
is -1. We focus on the computation of delta of collar. Utilizing Black and Scholes option pricing 
model, we plug in the contract specific variables, the interest rate and the historical volatility to 
solve for the delta of put and call component of the collar. We then aggregate the two delta 
components to get the total delta of the collar contract.  
Our computation of delta for the collar contract is -0.81, which is almost the same as Jin 
and Jorion (2006)’s delta, -0.80. The small difference could be due to slight differences in 
interest rate and volatility used in delta calculation. In addition, Jin and Jorion (2006) use 61 
million barrels as the production over the period of 2002 in the calculation of relative delta 
production. We obtain the production data from Bloomberg and also find a quite similar number 




Overall, compared to the computation in Jin and Jorion (2006), our model generates 
almost the same delta and relative delta production. The results verify the accuracy and quality of 




Appendix C: Summary Statistics of Key Variables, Including Firms with No Use of 
Derivatives 
As a robustness check, we include firms with no use of derivatives and re-calculate the 
summary statistics for key variables. The sample mean and median of Relative Delta Production 
are 57.56% and 38.93% respectively.  
 
  
N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Relative Delta Production 510 0.5756 0.6387 0.0001 0.3893 0.9092
Relative Notional Production 510 0.7046 0.7320 0.0005 0.5082 1.1300
Reported Total Profit 510 0.0134 0.0401 -0.0011 0.0000 0.0227
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 303 0.0089 0.0312 0.0000 0.0000 0.0057
Reported non-Hedge Profit 441 0.0093 0.0378 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0139






In the first essay, I use ETF returns as proxies for tradable risk factors in hedge fund 
performance evaluation and identify contemporaneously relevant risk factors from the entire 
universe of ETFs. The model provides more informative estimates of alpha and beta coefficients 
for predicting hedge fund out-of-sample performance compared with other widely used hedge 
fund factor models. Portfolios of top alpha hedge funds selected by the model generate 
statistically significant out-of-sample performance that is substantially higher compared with 
portfolios selected by other models. In addition, the beta-weighted clone portfolios exhibit 
substantially higher out-of-sample correlations with underlying hedge funds than clone portfolios 
formed using alternative models. 
The second essay shows that only hedge funds whose returns are driven by beta 
management of exposures to latent risk factors could be successfully replicated. I develop a 
methodology for creating a portfolio of ETFs that replicates risk factor exposures taken by 
successful beta active cloneable hedge funds. The methodology allows any investor to access 
active factor strategies employed by hedge funds. It could be interpreted as cloning beta 
exposures of the best beta active hedge funds, delivering outstanding long-term risk-adjusted 
performance. The active factor ETF portfolio only requires annual rebalancing, and is 
constructed with a transparent algorithmic approach, which conforms to a definition of a smart 
beta strategy. 
The third essay investigates the use of derivatives among firms. A careful study of 
hedging motives and hedging effectiveness is critical to understanding the financial impact of 
derivative use by firms. I examine the use of commodity derivatives by oil and gas producers and 




derivatives, particularly non-hedge profits, are positively associated with the extent of hedging 
that is classified as market timing activities. 
